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WISING UP: "SON OF SAM" LAWS AND THE
SPEECH AND PRESS CLAUSES
GARRETT EPPS*
"Son of Sam" laws aim to compensate victims of crime by
awarding them the income earned when the criminals who in-
jured them sell the stories of their illegal exploits to the media.
The prevalence of these statutes, which forty-three states and the
federal government have enacted, reflects overwhelming popular
approval of their underlying policy: "the victim must be more
important than the criminal. " The broad reach of "Son of Sam"
provisions, however, raises the question whether this well-meant
social legislation impermissibly burdens constitutionally pro-
tected rights of free expression.
In this Article, Garrett Epps relates the tale of New York
mobster Henry Hill, the writing of his autobiographical book
Wiseguy, and the litigation it spawned. The Hill saga illustrates
the conflict between preventing criminals from profiting at the
expense of their victims and protecting the First Amendment
rights of criminal authors. Mr. Epps first surveys the breadth of
"Son of Sam" statutes, identifying the complex issues of free
speech and press they create. He then recounts the history of the
Wiseguy case, pointing out the confused approaches that state
and lower federal courts have taken when analyzing the constitu-
tionality of "Son of Sam" statutes. Mr. Epps resolves this confu-
sion by noting that "Son of Sam" laws are targeted at the
content of expressive activity, and therefore are subject to the
strict-scrutiny analysis required by Supreme Court precedent.
He asserts that although the sweeping "Son of Sam" statutes fur-
ther a legitimate governmental interest in compensating victims
of crime, they are not narrowly tailored to achieve that goal be-
cause they do not attach to a criminal's assets generally, but only
to the proceeds from his literary ventures. Mr. Epps argues fur-
ther that, even if "Son of Sam" laws are not unconstitutional per
se, the overbreadth of many such statutes violates the Speech and
Press Clauses. In particular, he contends that sequestering the
proceeds ofpublishers and others who contract with criminal au-
thors. constitutes both a prior restraint and a licensing ofpublish-
ers in violation of the First Amendment. Mr. Epps concludes
* Law Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. A.B., Harvard College;
M.A., Hollins College; J.D., Duke University. The author thanks Professors Walter Dellinger
and William Van Alstyne of the Duke Law School for their help in the writing of this Article.
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that the rights of even criminal authors are firmly rooted in the
Constitution. He thus calls for a "wising up" with regard to the
constitutional issues raised by the Wiseguy case and for the strik-
ing down of "Son of Sam" laws as unjustifiable restrictions on
free speech and a free press.
I. AN AMERICAN LIFE: HENRY HILL, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY
Here is a classic American story.'
A young man of worthy family, ambitious and intelligent but poor,
finds himself adrift on the streets of a great city. He accepts a menial job
in the lowest level of the business organization of a rich and powerful
man. Through devotion to duty, creativity, and good luck, he attracts
the favor of the proprietor. His patron offers him greater and greater
responsibility. He excels in his work and soon amasses substantial means
of his own, as well as the love of a faithful woman. Children are born;
business affairs prosper. All is not smooth: there is domestic unhappi-
ness, public tribulation. At last, however, he turns to public service and
emerges from the trials of midlife wiser, happier, and more prosperous
than ever, a pillar of his community and a source of guidance for the
nation.
1. The autobiography is a recognized American art form:
Mythic autobiography, the major indigenous narrative form in American litera-
ture, originates in the Puritan diaries, where divine intent regarding an individual's
spiritual destiny is sought amid the obscure omens of personal events within the
physical world. Melville generalized this focus upon the juncture where the divine
manifests itself through nature into a theory of art when he asserted that art is a
meeting and mating of opposites. But this theory and such inside narratives as Billy
Budd and Moby Dick issuing from it had been preceded by Emerson's Transcenden-
tal version of the Puritans' symbolic drama within the single, separate person; and
they were later philosophically justified by William James' vigorous defense of the
"I", the interior life, as the only place where we can find real fact in the making. As
James saw it, then, the American imagination grabs hold at the precise moment
where the transformational event takes place, which occurs from the inside out, so its
truth can only be observed there, inside, while, miraculously, existence erupts from
being. It bears witness to and exemplifies creation, the individuating process
whereby, having gathered its powers at its source, purified of whatever would weigh
it down, whether matter, guilt, or egotism, the imagination leaps free. Thus, whether
practiced by Cotton Mather, Thoreau, Whitman, Hemingway, Henry Miller, or Wil-
liam Carlos Williams, to mention only the established literary figures, this form af-
firms as the supreme value for man the individual liberated from necessity and free to
act joyfully and for good in the world. Without a doubt, and vigorously, it celebrates
fact in the making.
Letter from William R. Robinson to George Garrett, reprinted in George Garrett, My Silk
Purse and Yours: Making It, Starring Norman Podhoretz, in THE SOUNDER FEW: ESSAYS
FROM THE Hollins Critic 327, 331-32 (R.H.W. Dillard et al. eds., 1971) [hereinafter Robinson
letter].
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This story has been told, in one fashion or another, since before the
American Revolution.2 Usually the protagonist is a humble printer, or
follows some other lawful trade. But the story may be the same in many
of its essentials even when it recounts the cursus honorum of an assiduous
foot soldier for organized crime.
The litigation that is the subject of this Article, embodied in the
decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Board3 and its affirmation by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti,4 concerns the auto-
biography of such a figure-Henry Hill, a former member of New York's
prominent Lucchese crime family.'
The story told in Wiseguy is of a figure remarkable in part for his
2. See, e.g., BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
(Modem Library ed. 1944). For archetypal fictional versions, see, e.g., HORATIO ALGER, JR.,
MARK MASON'S VICTORY: THE TRIALS AND TRIUMPHS OF A TELEGRAPH BoY (1899); Ho-
RATIO ALGER, JR., PHIL, THE FIDDLER: OR, THE STORY OF A YOUNG STREET MUSICIAN
(1872); HORATIO ALGER, JR., SLOW AND SURE: OR, FROM THE STREET TO THE SHOP
(1872); and others by the same author. A slightly darker version of the Alger story is told in
NATHANAEL WEST, A COOL MILLION: THE DISMANTLING OF LEMUEL PrrIN (1934).
Two nineteenth-century versions worth reading are FREDERICK DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS: THE LIFE OF AN AMERICAN SLAVE (1845), and BOOKER T. WASH-
INGTON, UP FROM SLAVERY (1901). More modem versions of the story can be found in
JIMMY CARTER, WHY NOT THE BEST? (1975); LEE IACOCCA, IACOCCA: AN AUTOBIOGRA-
PHY (1984); MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (1965); NORMAN
PODHORETZ, MAKING IT (1980); RONALD REAGAN, AN AMERICAN LIFE (1990); and many
others. Readers may protest that the author is permitting a slightly puckish tone to creep into
his selection of bibliographical references; however, the inclusion of works by admired figures
in this context is not totally whimsical. One of the subtexts of this Article is a suggestion that
the boundary between speech by criminals and speech by those whom we find more admirable
may be less easy to find than it seems. A careful reading of autobiographies by criminals or
those who admit to crimes, whether the work is by Malcolm X, Eldridge Cleaver, Jack Henry
Abbott, or Henry Hill, will reveal that these writings fulfill many of the conditions set by
critics for excellence in the category of autobiography. See, e.g., Robinson letter, supra note 1.
3. 724 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti,
916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 111 S. Ct. 950 (1991).
4. 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990), aff'g Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y.
State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), cert. granted sub nom. Simon &
Scliuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 111 S. Ct. 950 (1991).
Throughout the text of this Article, I refer to this litigation as "the Wiseguy case"; citations to
the district court decision use the short citation form "Crime Victims Board," and citations to
the court of appeals decision use the short citation form "Fischetti."
5. NICHOLAS PILEGGI, WISEGUY: LIFE IN A MAFIA FAMILY (1985). For Henry Hill's
family identification, see, e.g., id. at 18. The title comes from an underworld term for "gang-
ster." Id. at 19.
To me being a wiseguy was better than being president of the United States. It meant
power among people who had no power. It meant perks in a working-class neighbor-
hood that had no privileges. To be a wiseguy was to own the world. I dreamed
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energy and determination, in part for his simple ordinariness. If Sher-
lock Holmes's Professor Moriarty was the "Napoleon of Crime,"6 Henry
Hill might be denominated its Everyman. Without achieving promi-
nence in his crime organization, he was nonetheless involved in many of
its most sensitive and profitable operations:
It wasn't that Henry was a boss. And it had nothing to do with
his lofty rank within a crime family or the easy viciousness with
which hoods from Henry's world are identified. Henry, in fact,
was neither of high rank nor particularly vicious; he wasn't
even tough. . . . What distinguished Henry from most of the
other wiseguys ... was the fact that he seemed to have total
access to all levels of the mob world.7
Born on June 11, 1943, Hill went to work at the age of eleven as an
errand boy at a taxi stand in Brownsville-East New York owned by Paul
Vario,8 "a rising star in one of the city's five organized-crime families and
the man who ran most of the rackets in the area at the time." 9 While
working for Vario, Hill was introduced to, among other activities, coun-
terfeiting, 10 Christmas-tree fraud,1" gambling, 2 labor union corrup-
tion,13 and arson.14 By the time he was twenty-two, Hill was a trusted
member of Vario's crime organization.'" He married Karen Freid, a
young woman from Long Island, 6 and the couple had children. Hill's
career horizons subsequently widened to include hijacking of cargo
shipped in and out of New York's Kennedy Airport.'7 Hill and his asso-
ciates also began exporting stolen securities. 8 In 1972, he was sentenced
to ten years in prison for extortion.' 9 He was paroled six years later and
about being a wiseguy the way other kids dreamed about being doctors or movie stars
or firemen or ballplayers.
Id.
6. SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Final Problem, in 2 THE ANNOTATED SHERLOCK
HOLMES 301, 303 (William S. Baring-Gould ed., 1967).
7. PILEGGI, supra note 5, at 217.
8. Id. at 35.
9. Id. at 16.
10. Id. at 23-24.
11. This heartwarming organized-crime holiday ritual involves creating apparently salea-
ble but actually worthless Christmas trees out of discarded tree limbs, trunks, and glue. Once
at home, the trees fall apart. Id. at 24.
12. Id. at 25.
13. Id. at 28.
14. Id. at 30-31.
15. Id. at 61.
16. Id. at 71.
17. Id. at 88-89.
18. Id. at 92.
19. Id. at 142-43.
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returned to his crime career.20 Hill began selling drugs and firearms, 2 1
and distributing liquor to bars and restaurants illegally.22
Henry Hill's story is striking for its squalid moral atmosphere.
Murder was a common business technique for him and his associates:
It didn't take anything for these guys to kill you. They liked it.
They would sit around drinking booze and talk about their fa-
vorite hits. They enjoyed talking about them. They liked to
relive the moment while repeating how miserable the guy was.
He was always the worst sonofabitch they knew. He was al-
ways a rat bastard, and most of the time it wasn't even business.
Guys would get into arguments with each other and before you
knew it one of them was dead. They were shooting each other
all the time. Shooting people was a normal thing for them. It
was no big deal.23
Not long after his release on parole, Hill scored one of his most
notorious coups, convincing two Boston College basketball players to
shave points during the 1978-79 season.24 He also began to use drugs
and alcohol heavily.25 In 1978, he participated in a robbery of the Luf-
thansa cargo terminal at Kennedy Airport that netted $5,000,000 in cash
and $875,000 in jewels, "[t]he single most successful cash robbery in the
nation's history."' 26 However, the Lufthansa robbery and the wave of
assassinations that followed in a squabble over profits27 brought Hill to
the attention of New York law enforcement authorities, who arrested
him in the spring of 1980 on narcotics conspiracy charges.28 In May of
1980, Hill signed an agreement providing him with immunity from pros-
ecution in return for his testimony against his former associates, and en-
tered the federal Witness Protection Program.29 He and his family were
relocated and given new identities; as of the writing of Wiseguy:
20. Id. at 166.
21. Id. at 167-69.
22. Id. at 169.
23. Id. at 117. "They have no respect for human life at all, no respect for human life
whatsoever. I mean, that's their ultimate weapon, you know, is, you know, the fear, the bru-
tality and murder." 48 Hours: Badfellas (CBS television broadcast, May 29, 1991) (transcript
on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter 48 Hours]. Henry Hill steadfastly
insists that he himself never killed anyone, although he admits to having "cracked someone in
the head with a baseball bat." Id. He says he was present when others were killed, but "[m]ost
of the time, I dug the holes." Id.
24. PILEGGI, supra note 5, at 169-70.
25. Id. at 205.
26. Id. at 181.
27. Id. at 199.
28. Id. at 224.
29. For the text of the agreement, see id. at 241-42.
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Henry Hill and his wife live somewhere in America.... [H]e
has a successful business and lives in a $150,000 two-story ne-
ocolonial house in an area with such a low crime rate that gar-
den-shed burglaries get headlines in the weekly press. His
children go to private schools. He and Karen have their own
cars, and she has embarked on a small business of her own. He
has a Keogh plan. One of his few complaints is that he cannot
get good Italian food in the area where he has been assigned to
live by the witness program .... Henry gets fifteen hundred
dollars a month as a government employee, travels to New
York eight or nine times a year with all expenses paid, and has
food from Little Italy sent in to him at the courts where he
testifies and the hotels where he stays. He is always accompa-
nied to New York by armed marshals to make sure he doesn't
get murdered or mugged. In fact, Henry is so carefully
guarded by the U.S. Marshal Service that even the Internal
Revenue had to whistle when they tried to dun the old Henry
Hill for his back taxes. Thanks to the government for which he
works, Henry Hill has turned out to be the ultimate wiseguy.30
One of Henry Hill's minor sidelights is literary. He sold the story of
his point-shaving exploits to Sports Illustrated for $10,000.3' Thereafter,
he negotiated, through his lawyer, a contract with Nicholas Pileggi, a
veteran true-crime writer, to shape taped oral interviews about his life
into a book. Pileggi decided that a book about Henry Hill "might pro-
vide an insider's look at a world usually heard about either from the
outside or from the capo di tutti capi, top."'32 Pileggi traveled to undis-
closed locations under federal escort to conduct the interviews. 3 He also
interviewed federal prosecutors and law enforcement personnel to flesh
out the story of Hill's career.3 4 Wiseguy, according to recent court
figures, sold ninety thousand copies in hardcover and as many as one
million copies in paperback.35 The project also inspired a popular televi-
sion series 31 and a wildly successful movie, GoodFellas, directed by Mar-tin
30. Id. at 246. Since Wiseguy was published, Hill apparently has been dropped from the
Witness Program because he has continued to abuse alcohol and drugs. He also has divorced
and remarried. He is at work on another book and continues to keep his new name and
location secret. His post-Witness Program career is rather elliptically treated in 48 Hours,
supra note 23.
31. PILEGGI, supra note 5, at 245.
32. Id. at 12.
33. Id. at 11-12.
34. See Author's Note to id.
35. Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 779.
36. Wiseguy (CBS television series).
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Scorsese.37 Under Hill's contract with Pileggi and Simon & Schuster, the
book's publisher, the resulting royalties were divided between Pileggi and
Hill.38
These profits attracted the attention of the New York Crime Victims
Board, which in 1986 demanded that Simon & Schuster pay to the Board
a sum equal to the amount the publisher had already paid to Hill, as well
as Hill's share of any further proceeds from the book.3 9 The Board's
order was entered pursuant to New York's "Son of Sam" law-a statute
that permits the State to seize monies paid to criminals as payment for
their stories of crime, the money to be used to recompense victims of
those crimes.' Simon & Schuster challenged the Board's order in fed-
eral district court;4 1 after the district court granted the Board's motion
for summary judgment,42 the publisher appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, which rejected its First Amendment challenge to
the law.43 Upon petition by the publisher, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari early in 1991."
This Article considers the issue the Court must ponder-the consti-
tutionality under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the New
York law and other laws like it, not only as applied to the facts of Henry
Hill's case but also generally. Part II of the Article examines the range
of state statutes enacted with the same purpose as the New York law,
paying special attention to features that implicate First Amendment in-
terests. Part III analyzes the language, history, and operation of the
New York law and its accompanying administrative scheme, and re-
counts briefly the litigation that has transpired since the law's enactment.
Part IV discusses the opinions below in the Hill case. Parts V through
VII consider the case in the posture in which it arrives at the Supreme
Court, and set out three of the Court's options: (1) a holding, extending
the Court's opinion in Snepp v. United States,45 that statutes such as New
37. GooDFELLAS (Warner Bros. 1990).
38. Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 779.
39. Id. at 780.
40. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991). The term "Son of Sam"
law derives from the fact that New York's statute, the first of its kind, was introduced in
response to the prospect that David Berkowitz, the serial killer then at large and authoring
letters to newspapers under that name, would benefit financially from selling his story to the
media after he had been apprehended. See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
41. Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. at 172.
42. Id. at 180.
43. Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 784. The district court and circuit court opinions are discussed
in detail below. See infra notes 147-86 and accompanying text.
44. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 111 S. Ct.
950 (1991).
45. 444 U.S. 507, 514-16 (1980) (imposing a constructive trust for the benefit of the Gov-
1992] 499
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York's are permitted under the First Amendment; (2) a narrow holding
invalidating the New York scheme and others like it on the grounds of
overbreadth, prior restraint, and general violation of the Press Clause of
the First Amendment; and (3) a broad holding invalidating even such
statutes as avoid the features that would bring them under the narrow
holding outlined above. Part VIII concludes that the Court's previous
First Amendment jurisprudence, when considered together with the his-
tory of the First Amendment and the values it embodies, impels the
Court to invalidate the New York statute and all statutes, however care-
fully drawn, that, in pursuit of the stated governmental interest of com-
pensation for victims of crime, single out for special treatment the profits
received by criminal authors in the sale of their stories.
II. WHO Is THE TARGET?: STATE AND FEDERAL "SON OF SAM"
STATUTES ANALYZED
Since 1977, the federal government and forty-three states have en-
acted "Son of Sam" laws." Read together, these statutes help frame
analysis of the constitutional issues in the Wiseguy case. Though many
are modeled on New York's law, most states have varied the scheme in
ernment upon proceeds received from the publication of a book in breach of a contract not to
divulge classified information regarding Central Intelligence Agency activities). For a more
detailed discussion of Snepp, see infra notes 189-205 and accompanying text.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3681 (1988); ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-80 to -84 (1982); ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.61.020 (Supp. 1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
90-308 (Michie 1987); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225 (West Supp. 1991); COLO. R v. STAT. § 24-
4.1-201 (1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218 (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 9103 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-14-30
to -32 (Michie 1990); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 351-81 to -88 (Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE § 19-
5301 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 401-414 (Smith-Hurd 1989 & Supp. 1991); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-7-3.7-1 to -6 (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE § 910.15 (Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 74-7319 to -7321 (Supp. 1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.165 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1983); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:1831 to :1838 (West 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 764 (1987 & Supp. 1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258A, §§ 1, 8 (Law. Co-op. 1980 &
Supp. 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.768 (Vest 1982 & Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 611A.68 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); MISS. CODE. ANN. §§ 99-38-1 to -11 (1982); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 595.045(14) (Vernon Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-9-103, 104(1)(d)
(1989); NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-1836 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 217.265 (1985); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 52:4B-27 to -33 (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-22-22 to -23 (Michie 1990);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 2969.01-.06 (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17 (West Supp. 1991); OR. REv.
STAT. §§ 147.005, .275 (1989); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.18 (1990); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 12-25.1-1 to -12 (Supp. 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-59-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-28A-1 to -14 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-13-
201 to -208 (1980); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, §§ 3, 16-18 (West Supp. 1991);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12.5 (Supp. 1991); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 7.68.200-.280
(West Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.165 (West 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 1-40-112(d)
(1988).
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one way or another. Virtually all the statutes claim as their purpose
compensating the victims of crime.47 The means of achieving that end
are special provisions sequestering the proceeds of contracts between per-
sons convicted or accused of crime and media outlets4 8 that provide com-
pensation to the defendants in exchange for access to their point of view
in the story of the crime.4 9 Usually, though not always, the funds are to
be held (and, if necessary, distributed) by an administrative board, typi-
cally already in existence, that supervises the compensation of crime
victims.50
By and large, these statutes are a loosely drawn lot, seemingly
drafted with little thought about the constitutional issues they raise.
Though they are often given unexceptionable titles, such as "Limiting
47. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 (1982) (stating that board of adjustment should de-
posit monies obtained pursuant to "Son of Sam" statute in escrow account "for the benefit of
and payable to any victim of crimes committed by" a convicted felon); CoNN. GEN. STAT.
ANN § 54-218 (stating that clerk of court should deposit funds obtained pursuant to statute in
escrow account "for the benefit of and payable to such accused person for the expenses of his
or her defense and any victim of a crime of violence committed by such person"); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 346.165 (stating that monies obtained pursuant to "Son of Sam" statute should
be deposited into accounts "for the benefit of and payable to any victim" of the convicted
person's crimes); MINN. STAT. § 611A.68(4b) (West Supp. 1991) (authorizing crime victims to
make "claims for reparations and damages").
48. For convenience, this Article uses the term "media outlet" to represent anyone who
may wish to buy criminals' stories for later expressive use in any form. New York Executive
Law § 632-a defines its targets as
[e]very person, firm, corporation, partnership, association, or other legal entity con-
tracting with any person or the representative or assignee of any person, accused or
convicted of a crime in this state, with respect to the reenactment of such crime, by
way of a movie, book, magazine article, tape recording, phonograph record, radio or
television presentation, live entertainment of any kind, or from the expression of such
accused or convicted person's thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding
such crime ....
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982). Obviously, such sweeping language takes in
not only newspaper and magazine companies and film and broadcast producers, but also all
agents and intermediaries who may attempt to buy up the story rights and resell them.
49. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202B (stating that state commission is re-
quired to deposit monies received pursuant to statute for distribution as determined by the
commission to any victim of the convicted person's crime); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-31 (stipu-
lating that state board "shall deposit" monies obtained pursuant to "Son of Sam" statute "in
an escrow account for the benefit of and payable to any victim"); NEB. REv STAT. § 81-1836
(stating that state committee "shall deposit [funds obtained pursuant to the "Son of Sam"
statute] ... in the Victim's Compensation Fund").
50. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-22-3C, 31-22-4 (creating "crime victims reparation
commission" to receive and invest funds obtained pursuant to Crime Victims Reparation Act);
Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-40-103(a), -112(d) (authorizing "Wyoming victims of crime compensation
commission" to invest in escrow account monies received pursuant to Crime Victims Compen-
sation Act). But see ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308(a)(2) (requiring the circuit court to deposit
funds in escrow account for the benefit of crime victims).
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Commercial Exploitation of Crimes""1 or "Confiscation of Criminal
Royalties,"52 they are clearly aimed at speech, not at the proceeds of
crime generally; 3 furthermore, to a remarkable extent, they do not cre-
ate or enforce liability upon criminals at all, but rather upon the owners
of media outlets who might buy crime stories from them. 4 Lastly, they
have been drawn with little regard to procedural safeguards that might
protect the rights of those who become enmeshed in their operations.
To begin with, the seriousness of the crime required to trigger appli-
cation of the law varies widely. Only five states limit the laws' applicabil-
ity to felonies.55 Ten others and the federal government define the
predicate crime as one involving violence or personal injury.5 6 In the
remaining states, the statute's operation is triggered by any "crime," pre-
sumably including mail fraud, tax evasion, or even failure to pay parking
tickets. 57
All of the statutes contain language confining their operation to
monies received as a result of specific expressive activity by the individual
accused or convicted of the crime; this expressive activity is defined in
terms of its content. The most prevalent construction of triggering activ-
ities is that originated by the New York statute: "the reenactment of
such crime, by way of a movie, book, magazine article, tape recording,
51. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991).
52. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-3 (Supp. 1990).
53. Some of the statutes' titles are refreshingly frank about this speech-related aim. See,
e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-7-3.7-2, which is entitled "Contracts with responsible party for
publication or broadcast of crime story."
54. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2969.02(A) ("[A]ny person that enters into a Con-
tract with an offender... shall pay any money ... due under the contract... for deposit in the
recovery of offender's profits fund" if contract terms provide for a reenactment or publication
whose value arises from the notoriety brought by the commission of an offense.); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-59-40 ("Every person... contracting with any person... accused of crime in this
State, with respect to the reenactment of such crime... shall pay over... any monies" gained
thereby.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-202(a) (same).
55. ALA. CODE § 41-9-80; CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512(1);
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-7-3.7-2; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68.1(b) (West Supp. 1991).
56. See 18 U.S.C. § 3681(a) (offense against the United States resulting in physical harm);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218(a) (crime of violence); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 402.3
(Smith-Hurd 1989) (crime in which someone is killed or injured); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:1831(2)-(3) (crime of violence resulting in injury, death, or catastrophic property dam-
age); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(a)(2)(i) (1987) (crime resulting in injury, death, or prop-
erty loss); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.010(1) (crime of violence or driving while impaired); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 53-9-103(3)(b) (crime resulting in bodily injury or death); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-22-22A (violent crime); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.005(4) (crime resulting in serious bodily
injury or death); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-2(d) (felony resulting in personal injury or prop-
erty loss); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.165(l)(a) (serious crime).
57. See, eg., N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(l) (McKinney 1982) (providing for distribution of
monies to the victims of persons "convicted of a crime in this state"; for discussion of what is
covered by the term "convicted of a crime," see infra note 83 and accompanying text).
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phonograph record, radio or television presentation, live entertainment
of any kind, or from the expression of such accused or convicted person's
thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such crime."5 8
Though such language is quite broad, a few states go even further. Mon-
tana's law applies to all expression "relating to" the predicate crime;59
Ohio's applies to "any part of [the defendant's] life story... if the publi-
cation value results in part from notoriety brought by commission of an
offense."' Rhode Island's, by its terms, applies to any paid expression,61
while Wyoming's applies only to reenactments.6 2
The vast majority of the laws, like New York's, make the publisher,
not the felon, the target of their language.63 Only six state laws and the
federal statute are unambiguously drawn so as not to subject media out-
lets to their litigation and penalty provisions."4 At least eleven of the
laws require that media outlets contracting with accused or convicted
criminals who fall within their predicate submit contracts for review
before executing or paying on such contracts.6" Others do not require
submission of the contracts, but require outlets entering into such con-
tracts to notify state officials of their existence.66 Only six states and the
federal government have laws requiring an individualized court or ad-
58. Id.
59. MONT. CODE ANN. 53-9-104(1)(d).
60. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2969.02(3).
61. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-2(b).
62. WYO. STAT. § 1-40-112(d).
63. The New York statute's coverage includes "[e]very person, firm, corporation, partner-
ship, association or other legal entity contracting with any person or the representative or as-
signees of any person, accused or convicted of a crime in this state." N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-
a(1) (McKinney 1982) (emphasis added). This targeting of media outlets, rather than felons, is
a feature of the overwhelming majority of the statutes, and seems highly significant in consid-
ering whether the laws are in fact aimed at compensating crime victims or rather at inhibiting
or penalizing speech. Most of the statutes are content with implying that a media outlet that
does not comply with their terms may be subject to an order requiring payment to the board of
the same amount paid to the criminal, if such funds cannot be recovered from the criminal.
See, eg., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 346.165(1)-(2). In this connection, however, one statute
merits special mention. Alabama law provides that any media outlet not complying shall be
subject not only to double liability, but also to a prison term of up to 10 years. ALA. CODE
§ 41-9-80. Perhaps by coincidence, Alabama state tort law gave rise to the massive libel ver-
dict that was invalidated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3681(a); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308(a)(i); CAL. CIv. CODE § 2225;
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512(1); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.768(1); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 217.265; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17.
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9103(a); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-31(a)(1); IND. CODE
ANN. 16-7-3.7-2; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-28; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982);
OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-3(A); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 23A-28A-1; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 16; WAsH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 7.68.200; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 949.165(2).
66. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68.2a (West Supp. 1991).
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ministrative proceeding before any given media project can be brought
within the compensatory scheme.67 Only nine states and the federal gov-
ernment restrict the operation of their statutes to persons who have al-
ready been convicted;68 most of the rest provide that those accused shall
have their revenues sequestered, but that they shall be refunded by the
state if they are not convicted. 9 Three states, however, provide mecha-
nisms by which victims can seize such monies even from defendants who
are acquitted,"° and one state includes a standard deduction, which may
be substantial, from such monies even in crimes where there is no identi-
fiable victim and no conviction.71 Perhaps the most striking feature of
these laws, in view of their stated goal of furthering the compensation of
the crime's victims, is that fully twenty-six state statutes and the federal
law provide that all or a substantial part of the monies sequestered under
their provisions shall be forfeited even if no victims come forward to
make demands for compensation.72
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3681(a); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(3); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512(5);
IDAHO CODE § 19-5301(7); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN, § 780.768(2); NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 217.265; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.68.200. Special mention should be made of the proce-
dural care the Washington statute provides. No monies can be taken under its provisions
unless a court determines that the statute applies to them upon motion of the prosecutor and
after notice to the parties and a hearing. See id.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3681(a); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308(a)(1); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(B);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512(1); IOWA CODE § 910.15; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258A, § 8;
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.768(1); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61 1A.68. 1(c) (West Supp.
1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 217.265; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-15.1-3(A).
69. See, eg., IOWA CODE § 910.15(3) ("Upon disposition of charges favorable to any per-
son accused of committing a crime, . . . the attorney general shall immediately pay over any
money in the escrow account to the person."); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(e)(3)(i), (ii)
(1987) ("[Ihe Attorney General shall pay over to the defendant all of the funds from the
escrow account if... [t]he charges are dismissed or... [tihe defendant is acquitted...");
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 258A, § 8 (Law Co-op 1980) ("Upon disposition of charges favorable
to any person convicted of committing a crime,... the treasurer shall immediately pay over
any moneys in the escrow account to such person."); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.68.230
("Upon dismissal of charges or acquittal of any accused person the department shall immedi-
ately pay over to such accused person the moneys in the escrow account established on behalf
of such accused person.").
70. ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020 (allowing alleged victim to recover monies from fund even
if defendant acquitted upon proof of injury by a preponderance of evidence); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 9103(a)(2) (allowing alleged victim to obtain civil judgment even if defendant acquit-
ted); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-109(a) (Supp. 1990) (allowing victim to obtain funds from
defendant's proceeds by means of administrative proceeding under preponderance standard of
prof).
71. COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-4.1-201(3) (requiring defendant, even if acquitted, to repay
state for its expenses incurred in incarcerating him from monies received for expressive activity
concerning crime).
72. Total forfeiture is provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3681(c)(2); ALA. CODE § 41-9-82; ALASKA
STAT. § 12.61.020(a); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202(E); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-
308(c)(2); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218(b); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 406, § 6(c)
(Smith-Hurd 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-7-3.7-5; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7320(3); MD.
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Also potentially important in assessing whether these laws fulfill
their stated purpose of compensating victims, and whether in attempting
to do so they chill or reduce the volume of speech by those accused or
convicted of crime, is the fact that very few cases (in most jurisdictions,
none) have been brought under their provisions.73 The only statute
under which a significant body of case law has accumulated is New
York's; the statute and cases arising thereunder are examined in the next
section.
III. THE SCHEME OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE LAW SECTION 632-A
For the purposes of this Article, New York's "Son of Sam" law is of
preeminent importance for a number of reasons. First, it was the first
such statute enacted and provided a model that was followed by a
number of states. Second, it is the law of the state where, for better or
worse, the nation's print-publishing and broadcast-news industries are
centered. Third, it is the only one of these statutes under which a signifi-
cant body of case law has accumulated. And, finally, it is the legislation
at issue in the Wiseguy case. Accordingly, it is worthwhile to examine
the wording and legislative history of the statute, as well as the adminis-
trative regulations and case law it has spawned.
New York Executive Law section 632-a was passed in 1977 and
went into effect in August of that year.74 August was also the month in
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(e), (f) (allowing defendant to use some money for legal representa-
tion for criminal trial); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68.4, .4a (Supp. 1991) (allowing depen-
dents to get 10% as long as offender will reap no benefit); MIss. CODE. ANN. § 99-38-9(3)-(4)
(providing for forfeiture unless defendant has minor children in need of financial support); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 595.045(14)(5); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-104(l)(d); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:411-
30(a)(5); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2969.05; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17C; WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 7.68.240; WYo. STAT. § 1-40-112(f). Partial forfeiture is provided for by COLO.
REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-201; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-31(d)-();
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1832B; MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 780.768(3)(c); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 217.265; R.I. GEN. LAwS § 12-25.1-3(c); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-28A-5
(providing that state may recover costs of imprisonment of defendant but must first bring a
civil action). The other statutes provide for the return to defendants of monies not given to
identifiable victims of their misconduct.
73. In addition to the cases discussed in the next section, the only two reported cases are
Fasching v. Kallinger, 227 N.J. Super. 270, 275, 546 A.2d 1094, 1097 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1988) (holding that contract assigning publication rights to defendant's story to attorney as
compensation for criminal representation was not within scope of statute when entered into
before passage of statute), cerL denied, 114 N.J. 505, 555 A.2d 623 (1989), and Fasching v.
Kallinger, 211 N.J. Super. 26, 44, 510 A.2d 694, 703-04 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (holding
that New Jersey statute could reach only proceeds due directly to criminal-author, not those
due to agent and publisher). See Gregory J. Sarno, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application of "Son of Sam" Laws Regulating or Prohibiting Distribution of Crime-Related
Book, Film, or Comparable Revenues to Criminals, 60 A.L.R.4th 1210 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
74. Act of Aug. 11, 1977, ch. 823, 1977 N.Y. Laws (codified as amended at N.Y. EXEC.
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which David Berkowitz, a twenty-five-year-old psychopath, was arrested
for shooting thirteen young victims in Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx,
killing six and severely wounding seven over a period of many months. 5
Berkowitz, originally known as "the .44-caliber killer" because of the
handgun he used, became known as "Son of Sam" while still at large
because of the signature he used on a series of letters to New York news-
papers.76 The killings spurred New York's dailies, not known for their
restraint even in placid times, into a frenzy of sensationalism. The fact
that the slayer seemed to enjoy writing for publication-even though his
letters were incoherent-and the obsession of the press with the details of
his crimes combined to convince the legislation's sponsor that, if and
when the killer was caught, attempts would be made to purchase his
story from him. Accordingly, the legislature moved to amend a state
statute, originally enacted in 1966, that created a scheme to compensate
the victims of crime and created an administrative agency to carry it
out.7 7 The sponsor of the new provision placed in the legislative history a
memorandum explaining the reasoning behind the law:
It is abhorent [sic] to one's sense of justice and decency that an
individual, such as the forty-four caliber killer, can expect to
receive large sums of money for his story once he is captured-
while five people are dead, [sic] other people were injured as a
result of his conduct. This bill would make it clear that in all
criminal situations, the victim must be more important than the
Criminal.78
Another legislative memorandum noted that "[c]urrently a person
may commit a crime causing much damage and personal injury, and then
gain substantial financial benefits related to resulting publicity. This bill
will ensure that monies received by the criminal under such circum-
stances shall first be made available to recompense the victims of that
"979crime ....
The New York Division of Criminal Justice Services recommended
that Governor Hugh Carey sign the bill because
there has been a recent realization by the general public that
LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991)). For a review of the legislative history, see
Barrett v. Wojtowicz, 66 A.D.2d 604, 608-09, 414 N.Y.S.2d 350, 353 (1979).
75. Peter Bowles, Recalling a Serial Killer, NEWSDAY, June 20, 1990, at 7.
76. Id.
77. Act of Aug. 1, 1966, ch. 894, 1966 N.Y. Laws 2596 (codified as amended at N.Y.
EXEC. LAW §§ 620-635 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991)); see Barrett, 66 A.D.2d at 607-08,
414 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
78. 1977 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 267 (memorandum of Sen. Gold).
79. Assembly Bill Memorandum Re: A 9019, July 15, 1977, reprinted in Legislative Bill
Jacket, Act of Aug. 11, 1977, ch. 823, 1977 N.Y. Laws, quoted in Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 782.
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where a defendant is a well-known personality or the crime
with which he is charged is one that has aroused a high degree
of public interest, he is in a position to make a considerable
amount of money from articles, books or television accounts of
his life, times and crimes ....
[T]his bill takes cognizance of the situation and seeks to
redirect the money flow from the criminal to his victims. As an
expression of the concept of simple justice it cannot be faulted.
It is merely another facet of the oft-repeated maxim that crime
does not (or should not) pay."0
Not everyone involved in the bill's passage agreed that the proposed
law was not to be faulted. Included in the bill's history is a memoran-
dum from an official of the state budget division summarizing constitu-
tional arguments against the proposed measure. A final handwritten
comment states: "This bill is terribly drafted! ! Its intent & objectives
should be praised but it should be vetoed with a promise to resubmit a
bill which will (1) be clear [and] (2) have a chance of surviving a consti-
tutional attack."8" Despite the latter recommendation, Governor Carey
signed the bill.
In its present form, the statute requires any person or company con-
tracting with any person "accused or convicted of a crime in this state"
to provide payment for "the reenactment of such crime... or from the
expression of such accused or convicted person's thoughts, feelings, opin-
ions or emotions regarding such crime" to submit a copy of the contract
for review by the Crime Victims Board. 2 Significantly for the Wiseguy
case-and potentially important in assessing the constitutionality of the
statute's breadth-the statute defines a person "convicted of a crime" to
include, along with those actually convicted in court, "any person who
has voluntarily and intelligently admitted the commission of a crime for
which such person is not prosecuted."8 " The person or company also
must pay to the Board all monies owed to the defendant under the cov-
ered contract.8 4 The Board is to deposit the funds in an escrow ac-
80. Memorandum from Robert Schlanger, Division of Criminal Justice Services, to Judah
Gribetz (Aug. 3, 1977), reprinted in Legislative Bill Jacket, Act of Aug. 11, 1977, ch. 823, 1977
N.Y. Laws, quoted in Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 783.
81. Memorandum of Franklin E. White, Division of Budget, reprinted in Legislative Bill
Jacket, Act of Aug. 11, 1977, ch. 823, 1977 N.Y. Laws, quoted in Barrett, 66 A.D.2d at 611,
414 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
82. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982).
83. Id. § 632-a(10)(b). The statute purports to include within its ambit also persons
merely accused of crimes, but provides that a victim cannot receive payment until the accused
has been "convicted." Id. § 632-a(1).
84. Id. § 632-a(1).
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count.8  The funds may be used to pay victims of the defendant's crime
or crimes if the victims obtain a civil judgment against the defendant in
state court.
8 6
If a defendant is acquitted, or charges are dismissed, the escrowed
funds are paid to the defendant.17 A defendant found not guilty by rea-
son of insanity, however, does not receive such an automatic refund;
rather, such a defendant is "deemed to be a convicted person."88 After
five years, a convicted defendant can request the Board to refund any
surplus monies not claimed by victims, provided no civil actions are still
pending. 9 The Board must comply with such a request, but must first
seek to pay off subrogation claims of the State for amounts paid to vic-
tims by the Board before a civil judgment was rendered9" as well as all
other creditors who present "lawful claims, including state or local gov-
ernment tax authorities."'" The five-year period runs from the establish-
ment of the fund,92 and the statute of limitations for civil actions seeldng
compensation from the fund runs for the same five-year period.9 a The
defendant may, however, draw upon the funds in escrow to pay her law-
yers, but only to a maximum of twenty percent of the funds.94
New York state administrative regulations provide that the Board
may investigate contracts not submitted to it voluntarily95 and may, after
a hearing, enter a final decision bringing a contract under its authority.
96
The Board also may make an emergency determination that there is
"substantial danger.., that moneys [subject to the statute] may be con-
cealed, wasted, converted, assigned, encumbered, disposed of, or re-
moved from the State" before a determination; in such cases, or where
the paying party is not a resident of New York or a corporation regis-
tered in the state, the Board may issue an emergency order sequestering
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. § 632-a(3).
88. Id. § 632-a(S).
89. Id. § 632-a(4).
90. Id. § 632-a( l1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
91. Id. § 632-a(ll)(d). For an argument that subjecting the escrowed monies to claims
that have no relation to victim compensation vitiates the State's claim that its interest in com-
pensating victims justifies any intrusion on First Amendment rights, see Brief for the Petitioner
at 6, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., No. 90-1059
(U.S. filed Apr. 19, 1991).
92. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(7) (McKinney 1982).
93. Id. § 632-a(1).
94. Id. § 632-a(8).
95. N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 526.1 (1990).
96. Id.
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funds until a hearing can be held.97
Since its enactment, the section 632-a scheme has been used against
only ten projects.9" Not all of these cases have given rise to litigation,
and only two have provided substantial tests of the law's constitutional-
ity. The first decision held simply that the law should be read to extend
the statute of limitations so that an action against sequestered funds
could be maintained, even though this had the effect of reviving a cause
of action previously extinguished by the normal operation of the statute
and even though the predicate crime had been committed before the pas-
sage of the law.99 The holding allowed a suit by a plaintiff who had been
held hostage by the defendant during a bank robbery that led to a police
standoff."co The crime was later depicted in the successful film Dog Day
Afternoon.10 ' The law operated on monies contracted for before the pas-
sage of the statute. 10 2
The "Son of Sam" killer's affairs came before the courts shortly af-
terwards, in a case that permitted the court-appointed conservator for
Berkowitz, who had been declared incompetent, to take possession for
transfer to the Board of funds due the killer from a book contract.'0 3
Although the court pronounced the law constitutional as applied, the
conservator had challenged its operation only alternatively, and the court
upheld its constitutionality without elaboration."°
The Board fared less well when it attempted to move against the
substantial funds paid to Sydney Biddle Barrows, the aristocratic
97. Id. § 526.2.
98. Dennis Hevesi, Cases Under "Sam" Law: Notorious but Few, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
1991, at B8.
99. Barrett v. Wojtowicz, 66 A.D.2d 604, 614,414 N.Y.S.2d 350, 356 (1979). In the only
case concerning the federal "Son of Sam" law, by contrast, a federal district judge held that
under the ex post facto provisions of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, the law
could not be applied to proceeds from the successful book and movie Fatal Vision, which
depicted the killings of Jeffrey MacDonald's wife and children in 1970, a crime for which
MacDonald was later convicted. United States v. MacDonald, 607 F. Supp. 1183, 1185
(E.D.N.C. 1985). Though the book and movie recounted a version of events indicating that
MacDonald was guilty of the crimes, they did so under a financial arrangement by which the
author, Joe McGinniss, reimbursed MacDonald with a percentage of the proceeds from the
project. MacDonald, however, continues to assert his innocence of the crimes and has sued
McGinniss for the portrayal of him in the book and movie. See generally JANET MALCOLM,
THE JOURNALIST AND THE MURDER 7-8, 19, 120-30 (1990) (reviewing, from a point of view
sympathetic to MacDonald, the relationship and litigation between McGinniss and
MacDonald).
100. Barrett, 66 A.D.2d at 605, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
101. Id. at 606, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
102. Id.
103. In re Johnson, 103 Misc. 2d 823, 830, 430 N.Y.S.2d 904, 909 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
104. Id. at 826, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
1992]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
"Mayflower Madam" whose expensive call-girl business provided juicy
scandal when revealed in 1985. A state trial court ruled that, because
prostitution is a "victimless crime," the funds could not be seques-
tered. 105 The Board itself held that the funds paid to New York "Sub-
way Gunman" Bernhard Goetz were not subject to its reach because
Goetz's crime was also victimless: Goetz, though convicted of violating
state firearms laws, had not been convicted of assaulting the four youths
he shot. 106 In another case raising the same argument, however, Justice
Sherman declined to hear an argument by R. Foster Wynans, the Wall
Street Journal reporter convicted in federal court of insider trading, that
his crime was also victimless, and rejected constitutional and ex post
facto challenges to section 632-a as well.10
7
The first substantial challenge to the scheme's constitutionality was
brought by Jean Harris, the prep school headmistress who was convicted
of killing her former lover, Dr. Herman Tarnower, originator of the pop-
ular "Scarsdale Diet." 108 In her book, Stranger in Two Worlds, Harris
had sought to avoid the law's ban on accounts of a criminal's "thoughts,
105. The unreported decision is reviewed in Esther Pessin, Domestic News, UPI, June 3,
1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. See also No Victim, So "Madam" Free to
Kiss and Tell All, CHi. TRIB., June 4, 1986, at C4 (discussing the judge's decision that no
person suffered injury from Barrows's actions). The idea that prostitution is a victimless crime
is one that might be hotly disputed by feminists and other analysts of criminal law. The victim
apparently contemplated by the judge in the Barrows case was the male patron of Barrows's
enterprise, while a case could be made that the young women whose sexual services were
bartered are victims. The judge dismissing the Board's action was Justice Hortense Gabel,
herself later involved in an unrelated scandal regarding favorable treatment granted to former
Miss America Bess Myerson in a divorce proceeding in return for a job with Myerson's New
York municipal department for Gabel's daughter. See SHANA ALEXANDER, WHEN SHE WAS
BAD: THE STORY OF BESS, HORTENSE, SUKHREET AND NANcY 17 (1990). The Barrows
decision was summarily affirmed by the appellate division. In re Halmi, 128 A.D.2d 411, 411,
512 N.Y.S.2d 650, 650 (1987).
106. In re Goetz, slip op. at 7-8 (State of New York Crime Victims Board, March 17,
1988). The Board noted, however, that a particular type of crime will not be excluded abso-
lutely from the statute's application by being deemed a "victimless crime." Rather, the Board
will evaluate each case to determine if identifiable victims exist. Id. at 5-6. For an argument
that the holding in the Goetz case proves that the Board exercises political discrimination in its
determinations, see Brief of PEN American Center and New York Civil Liberties Union, amic
curiae, at 29, Fischetti (No. 89-9192).
107. St. Martin's Press v. Zweibel, 203 N.Y. L.J. 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 25, 1990). The
decision in St. Martin's Press runs directly counter to, and criticizes, the federal district court
decision in United States v. MacDonald, 607 F. Supp. 1183, 1185 (E.D.N.C. 1985), which held
that the federal "Son of Sam" statute could not constitutionally be applied to a crime commit-
ted before its passage. It also relies on the decisions in Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromells,
143 Misc. 2d 999, 1005, 541 N.Y.S.2d 894, 899 (Sup. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 161 A.D.2d 503, 556
N.Y.S.2d 483 (1990) (mem.), aff'd, 77 N.Y.2d 713, 573 N.E.2d 541, 570 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1991)
and Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 784, to uphold the New York statute against Wynans's constitu-
tional challenge.
108. Children of Bedford, 143 Misc. 2d at 1001, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
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feelings [and] opinions' 'I 9 about his or her crime by discussing her entire
life story, including her life behind bars, and describing the crime for
which she was convicted only by means of quotations from the transcript
of her trial.' 10 In Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, the trial court
held that even use of public records brought the contract within the
reach of section 632-a. 111 The court brushed aside Harris's challenge to
the statute's constitutionality under the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution" 2 and the speech and press clauses of the New York Con-
stitution 1 3 on the grounds that the statute does not prohibit expressive
activity, but "affects only the rights of the perpetrator to receive any
profit from communications concerning the crime unless and until all
proceeds have been held in escrow for five years and made available to
satisfy any civil judgment obtained against the wrongdoer."' "4 Thus, the
court concluded that the law was not subject to strict First Amendment
review because "[w]hat the law regulates... is not speech but disposition
of property (viz. royalties) derived from specified expressive activity by a
particular type of speaker.""' 5 A contrary holding, the court hinted,
would make it a violation of the First Amendment to garnish a writer's
salary-proceeds from expressive conduct-for child support." 6
109. N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982).
110. Children of Bedford, 143 Misc. 2d at 1001, 1003, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 896, 897.
111. Id. at 1003.04, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 898. The United States Supreme Court, in another
context, has found that material in court records should be available for use by all without
triggering statutory provisions otherwise forbidding disclosure of information. See Cox Broad-
casting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes
270-76 and accompanying text.
112. The First Amendment applies to the state statute by virtue of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664 (1925).
113. N.Y. CONSr. art. I, § 8.
114. Children of Bedford, 143 Misc. 2d at 1004705, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 898. Compare the
court's assumption that the First Amendment is not offended by anything short of an outright
prohibition with the language of the Amendment itself. "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis
added). "Abridge" is usually understood to mean "curtail" or "cut short," rather than "ex-
cise" or "eradicate." I THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 9
(1971). "Abridged" editions of lengthy best sellers are commonly sold by popular book-club
companies; it is difficult to imagine that their customers would accept blank volumes, from
which the entire text had been removed, as proper abridgments. Nor would it be acceptable to
sell cut versions of best-sellers as "unabridged" on the grounds that, because most of the text
remained, no abridgment had occurred.
115. Children of Bedford, 143 Misc. 2d at 1005, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
116. Id. at 1005-06, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 899. The Children of Bedford court confused a law
generally applicable to all funds-such as the garnishment statutes-with one facially drawn
to apply only to expressive activity with a certain content. In fact, a court would surely look
hard at a statute permitting the garnishment of the salaries of writers and writers only. Its
First Amendment suspicions might be even more thoroughly aroused by a statute that permit-
ted the garnishment of salaries paid to writers only of specified kinds of literature, or only of
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Although the Board was even then seeking to obtain from the publisher a
duplicate payment of the $45,000 already paid to Harris in advance roy-
alties, the court also turned back a Press Clause challenge, holding that
"the legislation ... places no burden on the press."'1 1
7
The court also endorsed an argument the law's defenders often re-
sort to in concrete cases: the law could not be voided for its potential
chilling effect on First Amendment protected expression, since, in the
case at bar, the book had been written. Since some books will be written
despite the statute, "the potential inhibiting effect of the statute on the
willingness of criminal-authors to write about their crimes .... is clearly
without foundation."" 8 Because the court found that the statute did not
violate the First Amendment or the speech and press clause of the New
York Constitution, it upheld the Board's order that all funds due Harris
be paid into the fimd. 119
The New York Appellate Division summarily upheld the decision in
Children of Bedford.120 In an opinion rendered after the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the Wiseguy case, the New York Court of Appeals
also affirmed the trial court's decision."21 The court of appeals, however,
applied a more rigorous standard in examining the law than the lower
courts had used,' 22 and its affimance hinted that Executive Law section
632-a, while constitutional in the case of the Harris book, might be un-
constitutional in other applications.' 23 After finding that Harris's book
works espousing certain points of view. This distinction among generally applicable economic
regulations, economic regulations aimed only at First Amendment protected activities, and eco-
nomic regulations aimed only at certain First Amendment protected activities based on their
content is the crux of much of the argument in the "Son of Sam" cases.
117. Id. at 1005, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
118. Id. at 1006, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 899. For evidence suggesting that the statute in fact has
chilled publishers and authors from undertaking projects potentially within its scope, see Brief
for the Petitioner at 17-21, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Vic-
tims Bd., No. 90-1059 (U.S. filed Apr. 19, 1991).
119. Children of Bedford, 143 Misc. 2d at 1009, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
120. Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 161 A.D.2d 503, 556 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1990)
(mem.), aff'd, 77 N.Y.2d 713, 573 N.E.2d 541, 570 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1991).
121. Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 77 N.Y.2d 713, 573 N.E.2d 541, 570
N.Y.S.2d 453 (1991),petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3109 (U.S. Aug. 13, 1991) (No. 91-
206).
122. Id. at 719, 573 N.E.2d at 543, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 455. The narrower reasoning of the
court of appeals follows precisely the same course as that applied by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit to the federal district court decision in the Wiseguy case, moving the
discussion from that of an "incidental" burden on speech, Crime Victims Board, 724 F. Supp.
at 177, to that of a "direct" burden on speech, Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 781. This result is plainly
more fully defensible than the "incidental" burden analysis. For a detailed discussion of this
analysis, see infra note 161.
123. See Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 731, 573 N.E.2d at 551, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 463;
infra text accompanying note 145.
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was properly within the statute124 and rejecting Harris's procedural due
process claim, 125 the court turned to the First Amendment question. Re-
lying on Meyer v. Grant,126 the court "conclude[d] that the statute is
content-based and imposes a direct burden on speech"127 because,
"[a]lthough the law does not foreclose the speaker's message, it imposes
an economic disincentive or penalty for delivering it."'128 Because of its
direct impact upon protected speech, the court reasoned, the law's pro-
ponents "must demonstrate that it serves a compelling State interest and
is narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose." 129 The court found several
such interests served by the statute: "facilitating compensation for vic-
tims" of crime by criminals rather than the public; 3' "preserv[ing] the
victim's equitable right to assets earned by a criminal as a result of the
victimization"; "31 and "embody[ing] the community's belief that it is not
only wrong for criminals to commit crimes and profit from them but also
wrong for criminals to salt their victims' wounds by profiting from the
victimization without recompense to the victims." '32
124. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 722, 573 N.E.2d at 545, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 457.
125. Id. at 722-24, 573 N.E.2d at 545-46, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 457-58.
126. 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
127. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 724, 573 N.E.2d at 545, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
128. Id. at 725, 573 N.E.2d at 547, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 459 (citations omitted). This mode of
reasoning is a more rigorous, and preferable, application of the "abridgment" test of whether
an enactment im'plicates First Amendment interests. See supra note 114 and accompanying
text.
129. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 725, 573 N.E.2d at 547, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 459 (cita-
tions omitted).
130. Id. at 725-26, 573 N.E.2d at 547, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
131. Id. at 726, 573 N.E.2d at 548, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
132. Id. at 726-27, 573 N.E.2d at 548, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 460. Schoolchildren sometimes
play a prank that involves offering another child some handsome reward if he or she will
simply not think about green alligators for five minutes. The court's discussion of "salting
wounds" underscores that a similarly all-but-hopeless mental exercise is involved in defending
a "Son of Sam" statute while maintaining with logical consistency that its intention relates to
victim compensation or to general equitable principles rather than to an intent to punish or
suppress speech. The court is at pains later to deny that other profits earned by a criminal as a
result of notoriety gained through his or her crime should be regarded as fair game for this
asserted interest. See id. at 729, 573 N.E.2d at 549-50, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 461-62; infra text
accompanying note 139. Apparently such profits do not "salt the wounds" inflicted by the
crime. If so, however, what distinguishes these profits from profits earned by paid speech and
makes the latter subject to the asserted interest while the former are not? Only one thing
distinguishes profits derived from speech from other profits-the expressive content of the
speech from which they are derived. The court may be regarded as having dropped this shoe
in the language above. It immediately attempts to muffle the sound, by insisting that "[tihe
statute's purpose is to compensate crime victimst,] not to protect their sensibilities or those of
the public, by restricting offensive speech." Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 727 n.2, 573
N.E.2d at 548 n.2, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 460 n.2 (citations omitted). This logic is difficult to follow.
If expressive activity, and only expressive activity, salts the victims' wounds, then the salting
must take place through the perception of the activity-that is, through its expressive impact.
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Having identified the interests to be served by the statute, the court
then proceeded to find it "narrowly tailored" to achieve those inter-
ests.133 The tort laws "do not satisfactorily address the need" for victim
compensation, the court held, because of the three-year statute of limita-
tions they impose. 134 Likewise, civil attachment statutes do not solve the
problem, 35 because they impose restrictive conditions as to which de-
fendants may be subject to them. 36
The court rejected Harris's arguments that the statute is underinclu-
sive because "it does not reach income earned from writing generally,
income earned from other crime-related activities such as wages received
by a convicted computer expert who subsequently obtains profitable em-
ployment as a result of illegally 'bugging' computer networks, or after-
acquired property of the criminal."' 37 This argument, the court said,
"misses the point. The statute was never intended to reach profits re-
ceived solely as a result of the criminal's notoriety."'' 38 The difference
between the two types of profits, the court reasoned, is that the computer
expert's financial reward "is the result of [the criminal's] newly adver-
If the mere fact of profiting were the salt in the wound, then profit gained through other
activity made possible by criminally gained notoriety would surely provide as much salt; but
since it is expression that provides the salt, it must be the victim's (or the public's) sensibilities
that are being protected. As the court correctly notes, id., such an intent would bring the
statute into conflict with Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (holding unconstitutional
statute that forbids flag-burning for the purpose of conveying specified ideas) and with Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (disallowing tort claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress when protection of public figure's emotional sensibility would require penal-
izing protected, albeit highly offensive, speech).
133. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 728-29, 573 N.E.2d at 549-50, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 461-
62.
134. Id. at 728, 573 N.E.2d at 549, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
135. Id. at 713, 573 N.E.2d at 549, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 461; see N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R.
6201-26 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1991) (providing general procedure for attaching property
to be held for satisfaction of possible future judgments in certain circumstances).
136. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 713, 573 N.E.2d at 549, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
Nowhere, however, does the court address the question of why these civil attachment statutes
could not be amended to provide for an extended limitations period in the case of tort actions
brought by victims of crime. The argument that the "Son of Sam" law is narrowly tailored
because other laws are not so tailored can be seen thus as a circular ratification of legislative
choice: a law impinging on First Amendment interests must be upheld, according to this
argument, because the legislature did not choose to vindicate the interests involved by pursu-
ing them in ways that would not abridge free speech. To put it even more baldly, the law is
narrowly tailored because the legislature passed it. The court does state that "[e]ven if the
attachment laws were expanded to provide a remedy for crime victims, the provisions neces-
sarily would operate much like Executive Law § 632-a." Id. This reasoning is strained: a
neutral attachment procedure would operate unlike § 632-a in the crucial area of differentially
targeting speech, a highly significant difference, even if other parts of the statute were similar
to § 632-a.
137. Id. at 728-29, 573 N.E.2d at 549, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
138. Id. at 729, 573 N.E.2d at 549, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
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tised prominence or expertise, not their illegal act. By contrast, criminals
covered by the statute had no marketable asset before the crime: they
create, by illegal activity, a new product-a story which becomes profita-
ble in the retelling."' 13 9 Other types of gains "do not come within the
purpose of Executive Law section 632-a which is intended to protect the
victim's equitable claim to profits earned by a criminal from speech made
possible by reason of their [sic] victimization.'"140
The court also rejected the argument that section 632-a unconstitu-
tionally inhibits publishers and other contracting parties from participat-
ing in protected activities.'41 Publishers and writers may still "write and
publish about crime in general or from the perspective of the perpetra-
tor"'42 and nothing in the statute "prevents publishers from profiting in
full from publishing any work about the crime."' 43
The court concluded that "section 632-a is narrowly tailored to
meet the state's compelling interest in securing a victim's equitable right
to be compensated from moneys earned by a criminal as a result of the
victimization."" It rejected a challenge that the law is vague, but its
language left a glimmer of hope that an attempt at overreaching by the
Board-attempting to apply the law's provisions, for example, to a book
by an author who has never been charged or convicted of crime but who,
like Malcolm X, admits briefly to previously unknown crimes or to
crimes of conscience in the course of a larger work-might be struck
down at a later time: "Such questions are matters for interpretation ....
The Constitution does not require that a law be drafted with such speci-
139. Id. at 729, 573 N.E.2d at 549-50, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 461-62.
140. Id. at 729, 573 N.E.2d at 550, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 462 (emphasis added). Once again, the
Children of Bedford court defined the statute's scope in terms of its admittedly speech-related
intent. The law is narrowly tailored to achieve its end, because the end is that of seizing the
fruits of speech. Since other assets acquired by a criminal as a result of the crime are not the
result of speech, they do not fall within the narrowly tailored scheme. Arguably, this conten-
tion proves the opposite of the court's conclusion-Le., that the legislature wished to penalize
speech and speech only, and thus had no neutral aim in mind. Had it had a neutral aim, the
legislature would surely have sought to attain it by sequestering assets that come to criminals
who sell their expertise as criminals-expertise gained, no less than is compensation for paid
speech about the crime, by victimizing those whom § 632-a claims to be seeking to compensate
and protect.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. The above is a slight case of judicial overstatement; the law potentially subjects a
publisher to double liability if it mistakenly pays an author who is later found by the Board to
be within the statutory scheme and from whom the sums paid cannot be recovered. This
potential liability may not be considered a crippling disincentive to contract for and publish
criminals' stories about their crimes, but it is, nonetheless, a genuine one, and should not be
brushed aside as "nothing."
144. Id.
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ficity that it leaves no room for interpretation nor is it void for vagueness
merely because situations may exist in which it should not be applied." '145
Whatever the prospects for a later decision excepting a specific pro-
ject from the scheme of section 632-a, the court of appeals decision
makes clear that the New York courts are prepared to uphold the statute
in the majority of cases. The remaining substantial challenge to section
632-a's constitutionality-and to the other laws like it around the coun-
try146-- is the case of Henry Hill, currently pending before the United
States Supreme Court.
IV. HENRY HILL IN THE LOWER COURTS
The decisions of the lower federal courts illustrate the slipperiness of
the First Amendment issues posed by the Wiseguy case and by "Son of
Sam" laws in general. The federal district court that initially ruled on
the law's constitutionality held that the law did not directly abridge
speech. 147 The Second Circuit panel that reviewed that decision cor-
rectly grasped that the law operated directly on protected speech, but
applied such a narrow balancing test to the interests involved that a vic-
tory for the Board was all but assured.1 48 A persuasive dissent in the
court of appeals argued that the law was unconstitutional. 149
After receiving the Board's order imposing liability on Simon &
Schuster for sums already paid to Henry Hill, the company filed suit in
federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that Executive Law
section 632-a was unconstitutional and an injunction against enforcement
of the Board's order.15 Both sides moved for summary judgment.'51
Judge Keenan of the Southern District of New York rejected the pub-
lisher's arguments that section 632-a violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments on grounds of prior restraint, content-based restrictions on
speech, and overbreadth.1 52
The court analyzed the First Amendment issues and concluded that
the law does not abridge protected speech. First, it noted that "although
145. Id. at 731, 573 N.E.2d at 551, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 463 (citations omitted).
146. See supra note 46.
147. Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. at 173.
148. Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 782-84. For a discussion of the court of appeals decision, see
infra notes 167-86 and accompanying text.
149. Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 784-87 (Newman, J., dissenting). For an examination of Judge
Newman's dissenting opinion, see infra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
150. Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. at 173. For details of the Board's order, see supra
notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
151. Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. at 172.
152. Id. at 179.
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it may be more difficult for publishers and authors to create books with
the cooperation of a criminal source, it is not impossible nor is such co-
operation proscribed by section 632-a."153 The prior review of contracts
mandated by the law "does not prohibit expression" 54 and the law does
not "prohibit speech."' 55 The court distinguished the statute's regula-
tion of payment from the regulation the Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional in Meyer v. Grant 6 because that "statute operated directly to
affect political speech" while section "632-a has no abridging effect on
political speech."' 5 7 In fact, the court held that section 632-a's effect "is
limited to the nonexpressive elements of the [expressive] activity: receiv-
ing a profit,"'5 8 just as the law upheld in United States v. O'Brien 1'5 9 was
limited to the nonexpressive act of destroying a draft card, an identifica-
tion document whose existence and availability would be necessary in the
event of national emergency. Because "[t]he state's interest in compen-
sating crime victims is unrelated to the suppression of free expression...
any burden on free expression is merely incidental.""1co Thus, "the Court
need not apply a test of strict scrutiny to the statute," but instead might
apply the lesser standard dictated by O'Brien.'6' The statute survived
153. Id. at 176.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 486 U.S. 414 (1988). For details of the holding in Meyer, see infra notes 297-99 and
accompanying text.
157. Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp.'at 177. For an analysis of the argument that burden-
ing speech does not abridge it, see supra note 114 and accompanying text.
158. Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. at 177.'
159. 391 U.S. 367, 378-82 (1968); see infra note 161.
160. Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. at 177.
161. Id. at 178. Litigation of the constitutional issues posed by § 632-a has followed the
same conceptual course in the New York and federal systems. The trial courts have analyzed
the law as falling under O'Brien and imposing only an "incidental" burden on speech. See,
eg., id. at 177; Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 143 Misc. 2d 999, 1005, 541 N.Y.S.2d
894, 899 (Sup. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 161 A.D.2d 503, 556 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1990) (mem.), aff'd, 77
N.Y.2d 713, 573 N.E.2d 541, 570 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1991). Appellate courts, while affirming the
result below, have in both systems held that O'Brien is not applicable and that the law directly
burdens speech. See, eg., Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 781; Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis,
77 N.Y.2d 713, 724, 573 N.E.2d 541, 545, 570 N.Y.S.2d 453, 459 (1991). The second result-
that § 632-a cannot be understood as an extension of O'Brien's "symbolic speech" analysis-
seems clearly the better view. O'Brien concerned a defendant who burned his draft registration
card as part of an antiwar protest. The Supreme Court considering his appeal noted that the
law forbidding destruction or mutilation of a draft registration card for any reason "plainly
does not abridge free speech on its face," and not even O'Brien himself argued to the contrary.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 375. In the case of § 632-a, this is plainly not so. By preventing criminal
authors from receiving payment, this law does, on its face, abridge freedom of speech. See
supra note 114. It singles out expressive conduct-and expressive conduct with specific con-
tent-for its regulation, just as a statute making it illegal to burn a draft card as part of a
protest would do. As the O'Brien Court noted, the test in that decision is to be applied when
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such scrutiny because
any incidental restriction of First Amendment freedom im-
posed by section 632-a is no greater than is essential for the
government interest in compensating crime victims. The law is
drawn not to prohibit expressive activity, but to garnish the
proceeds so that they will be used in a productive manner. The
statute reaches only proceeds from expressive activity for the
purpose of preventing a criminal from directly profiting from
his or her crime. The Court thus finds that section 632-a with-
stands the O'Brien test and that it is not unconstitutional on its
face nor as applied to plaintiff.'62
The district court opinion ignored some crucial questions about a
law regulating the profits from speech. Even though the law admittedly
makes it more difficult for media outlets to find speakers and produce
protected speech, it held that such a result was not forbidden because it
does not prohibit speech. Such a distinction dodges the textual prohibi-
tion within the First Amendment on laws that "abridg[e]" freedom of
the law is facially not aimed at expression and "'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are com-
bined in the same course of conduct." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. When considering the issue of
paid free speech, it requires a highly formalistic analysis to separate "speaking" from "receiv-
ing payment for speaking," akin to separating "practicing law" from "billing clients," and
declaring that someone forbidden to do the latter remains free to do the former. Such a fine
parsing was plainly not within the intention of the O'Brien Court.
Even if the O'Brien test is applied to this case, it is highly problematic whether § 632-a
can pass it. The fourfold test of O'Brien requires that, to be constitutional, an "incidental"
burden on speech must: 1) be within the constitutional power of government; 2) further an
important or substantial governmental interest; 3) be unrelated to suppression of free expres-
sion; and 4) impose an incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms no greater than is
essential to further that interest. Id. at 377. The third prong is the crucial part of the O'Brien
test-what Professor Rodney A. Smolla calls the "gatekeeper." Rodney A. Smolla, Academic
Freedom, Hate Speech, and the Idea of a University, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990,
at 195, 210 n.55. As Professor Smolla points out, this prong can have two different interpreta-
tions. The first is simply that the rationale, the stated aim of the law, must be unrelated to
speech. Id. That is the case here-the stated aim of the "Son of Sam" laws is victim compen-
sation, which has nothing to do with limiting speech. However, as Professor Smolla notes, "all
laws restricting freedom of speech are passed because of some 'interest unrelated to [... ] free
expression.' . . . No law abridging freedom of speech is ever promoted as a law abridging
freedom of speech." Id. (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377). Professor Smolla points out that
"[t]he sound interpretation of the phrase 'unrelated to free expression' focuses not upon the
ultimate goal of the legislation, but rather upon whether the justifications for the law advanced
by the government have nothing to do with the communicative aspects of the conduct be
regulated." Id. Section 632-a cannot pass part 3) because it is plainly related to suppression of
free expression, as it is aimed at certain expressive conduct because it is expressive. It may not
be aimed solely at such suppression (though it is hard not to suspect that it and many of its
sister statutes are not at least primarily so intended), but it is very hard for courts to explain
the statute's aim without including some discussion of the distaste felt by the public and the
victim for paid expression by criminal authors. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
162. Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. at 179. The court also rejected the overbreadth
challenge on grounds that the law "sets forth its scope in readily discernible language." Id.
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speech, not merely on those that prohibit it. 6 ' Further, the court di-
vided expressive activity into two segments: first, actually speaking (pro-
tected) and, second, receiving payment for it (unprotected).' Such a
division cannot survive logical or historical16 scrutiny. By this division,
the court was able to avoid examining the statute as a restriction on
speech. In its review of the statute as an incidental regulation, it steered
past the test of narrowness by holding that, having been designed to de-
prive criminals of the proceeds of speech, the statute was narrowly drawn
because it did exactly what it set out to do. As the Second Circuit dissent
made clear, 66 such an analysis is classic question-begging: a regulation
designed to restrict speech is by definition narrowly drawn if it restricts
only the speech it is drawn to restrict. The proper question is whether
the decision to impose a restriction on speech is a narrowly drawn means
of pursuing the statute's nonspeech-related aim.
The First Amendment issues in the Wiseguy case received more
careful consideration by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.167
Although a divided panel upheld the judgment of the district court, even
the judges who voted to affirm rejected the district court's reasoning.168
Writing for the majority, Judge Miner began by holding that "the statute
... imposes a direct, rather than an incidental, burden on speech and...
therefore must meet the requirements of the strict scrutiny test to survive
the constitutional challenge."16 9 The statute required such scrutiny be-
cause it "burdens directly the speech of those who wish to tell (and sell)
the stories of their crimes.... Without a financial incentive to relate their
criminal activities, most would-be storytellers will decline to speak or
write," and this burdening of speech implicated the First Amendment. 1 70
Thus the court considered itself required to inquire whether the statute
furthered "a state interest that is compelling" by means of "legislation
narrowly constructed to accomplish its purpose." '171
The court of appeals reasoned that the statute furthered two such
interests: "preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes" '172 and
"assuring that a criminal not profit from the exploitation of his or her
163. See supra note 114.
164. Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. at 177-78.
165. See infra notes 310-11 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
167. Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 781-84; id. at 784-87 (Newman, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 781.
169. Id. at 778.
170. Id. at 781 (citing Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422-24 (1988)).
171. Id. at 782.
172. Id. (citing Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-12, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (1889)). For a
discussion of the relevance of Riggs, see infra notes 205-17 and accompanying text.
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crime while the victims of that crime are in need of compensation by
reason of their victimization." 173 The court held that the statute was
"narrowly tailored to the State's interest in denying criminals any gain
from the stories of their crimes until the victims of those crimes are fully
compensated."174 The requisite narrowness existed because "the only
way a criminal can profit directly from a specific crime involving a par-
ticular victim, other than by obtaining any proceeds of the crime itself, is
by writing or talking about or reenacting it '175 and because "as a practi-
cal matter, the sole asset of most criminals is the right to tell the story of
their crimes."1 76 Such an asset is "derived from the notoriety of the
criminal rather than from his or her labors." 177 The court brushed aside
an objection by the publisher that criminals can profit in other ways,
such as by selling their expertise as crime prevention consultants, because
"[t]he general expertise derived by a thief from a series of thefts is not the
same as the tale of a specific theft committed against an identifiable
victim."
' 1 7 8
Thus, the court of appeals concluded that "if the compelling state
interest is to compensate victims of crimes out of the proceeds of the sale
of stories of their victimization before anyone else benefits, the statute
narrowly is drawn to do just that. 179
The majority opinion sparked a careful dissent by Judge Newman.
The dissent's main focus was the majority's conclusion that the statute is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. To this question,
Judge Newman wrote,
the Court applies a legal analysis that defines the state interest
being advanced in terms of the statute's scope, thereby reaching
the circular result that the scope of the statute is precisely tai-
lored to the state's objective. But the question in all such cases
is whether a state, consistent with the First Amendment, can
pursue its objective by focusing on speech of particular con-
tent .... Every content-based discrimination could be upheld
by simply observing that the state is anxious to regulate the
173. Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 782. The court also cited academic comment to support other
purposes: preventing unjust enrichment; making victims less likely to need public assistance;
satisfying victims' needs for retribution; and increasing the criminal's awareness of the conse-
quences of his crime. Id. at 783.
174. Id. at 783.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 784.
178. Id. Note, however, that the admission in an expressive project would be enough to
activate § 632-a, even without a "specific theft" or an "identifiable victim." See supra note 83.
179. Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 784.
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designated category of speech.180
Judge Newman also questioned the majority's reasoning that expres-
sive proceeds are the only assets criminals are likely to have: "Of all
criminals who might be liable for restitution, many have assets independ-
ent of the proceeds of their crimes." ' These assets would be available
to a non-content-based restitutionary scheme. Judge Newman also ar-
gued that the statute should be invalidated because it imposed a restric-
tion on expressive activity based on Content,8 2 and because it imposed
double liability8 3 on publishers and would lead them to "purge" their
books of all material "arguably within the scope of the statute."' 84 He
argued that the aim of victim compensation could and should permissi-
bly be pursued by strengthening state restitution and attachment statutes
applicable to criminals' assets generally, rather than by singling out as-
sets generated by speech; such a measure would be more effective in pro-
viding general victim compensation, he argued, because section 632-a
"[i]n the first eleven years of its operation ... has produced just five
escrow accounts, three of which involved the same criminal."' 8 5
Judge Newman concluded by defending the free speech interests in-
volved in any legislative measure that chilled speech by persons accused
or convicted of crime:
Wiseguy, the book at issue in this case, and its film adaptation,
GoodFellas, may not be profound additions to public under-
standing of crime, but they are significant contributions....
[Simon & Schuster] does not engage in hyperbole by inviting us
to consider whether it or any other firm would have published
Where Do We Go From Here? by Martin Luther King, Jr., Wit-
ness by Whittaker Chambers, or On Civil Disobedience by
Henry David Thoreau, had the crimes of these authors been
committed in New York State while section 632-a was in
effect.18
6
It must respectfully be noted that the dissent seems to have the bet-
ter of this exchange. The majority avoided the conceptual pitfall of view-
ing the statute as only incidentally affecting speech, but it fell into the
trap, cited by Judge Newman, of analyzing the statute's narrowness of
180. Id. at 785 (Newman, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 786 (Newman, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 786-87 (Newman, J., dissenting). This happened in the Wiseguy case. See
supra text accompanying note 39.
184. Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 786-87 (Newman, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 787 (Newman, J., dissenting).
186. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
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purpose only in terms of its speech-related intention rather than of its
legitimate nonspeech-related aim.
It was in this posture that the case came before the Supreme Court,
with Simon & Schuster seeking reversal of the Second Circuit's decision.
V. GODSON OF SNEPP: A HOLDING APPROVING "SON OF SAM"
LAWS
First Amendment speech and press debates often tend to be charac-
terized by a large degree of missed communication. Opponents of re-
strictive government dctions under review are too frequently given to
insisting, on the strength of little more than ipse dixit, that the particular
measure at issue involves the very heart of the First Amendment and free
expression generally, that its proponents are ill-intentioned and deceitful
advocates of censorship, and that an adverse decision will place the re-
public upon a "slippery slope" whose only conceivable destination is a
nightmare totalitarianism indistinguishable from that of Airstrip One,
the antiutopia portrayed in George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four.18 7
On the other side, proponents of the measure under review respond
in soothing, even soporific tones. They are likely to insist that the restric-
tion involved does not really restrict speech at all, and further that, even
if it does, the restrictionis so small and insignificant that no one will ever
even notice the gap in expressive freedom it creates.188
As a matter of First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court's prior
decisions suggest that it should invalidate the New York statute and all
such attempts to attach the proceeds of speech by criminal defendants.
However, I do not wish to add to the rhetorical fog surrounding these
issues by suggesting that the social dilemma addressed by "Son of Sam"
laws is not one that courts quite properly may find wrenching. The im-
pulse behind these laws-the desire of the community that hateful
criminals not profit frodh selling their stories-is a very real one. No one
with a thoughtful concern for the future health of our society can fail to
be appalled by a situation in which media and public alike focus vast and
187. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). See generally PHILIP MEYER,
ETHICAL JOURNALISM: A GUIDE FOR STUDENTS, PRACTITIONERS AND CONSUMERS 8-11
(1987) (suggesting that "slippery slope" rhetoric is usually overdrawn).
188. This soothing rhetorical tone is adopted by the district court in the Wiseguy case.
Crime Victims Board, 724 F. Supp. at 176; see supra notes 153-66 and accompanying text. An
acute legal analysis of this type of rhetoric as used by the Supreme Court in the context of the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause is found in William Van Alstyne, Trends in the
Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall: 4 Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984
DUKE L.J. 770. For a discussion in parable, see GARRETT Epps, THE SHAD TREATMENT 333
(1977) ("Lie still, little shad .... I'm not going to do a thing to you but cut all your bones
out!").
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lucrative concern on the stories of violent criminals, without a corre-
sponding regard for the interests, and suffering, of those harmed by
crime. An oversimplified analysis of American popular culture might
divide its consumers into those who sympathize with the cops and those
who sympathize with the crooks. Precious few stories focus on the ordi-
nary people whose lives are shattered and destroyed by violent crime.
It is possible that a majority of the present Supreme Court might
conclude that the First Amendment should permit the legislature to in-
tervene and alter this state of affairs by burdening and penalizing the
speech of criminals. Such a majority would find at least one recent prece-
dent that explicitly approves the sequestration-in fact, the confisca-
tion-of proceeds of expressive activity when they are earned by
someone who has stepped outside society's rules. This case, Snepp v.
United States,'89 might form the nucleus of a holding permitting states
and the federal government to enforce their "Son of Sam" laws.
Snepp concerned a book by a former case officer for the Central In-
telligence Agency who had signed an agreement promising not to reveal
classified information learned in the course of his employ and to submit
for prepublication review anything he wrote after leaving the CIA.190
After leaving the agency, Snepp wrote a book, Decent Interval,'9' which,
the Government stipulated, revealed no classified information.192 How-
ever, he did not submit the book for review. 193 The district court then
subjected all Snepp's proceeds from the book to a constructive trust for
the benefit of the agency, 194 a remedy the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit disallowed' 95 but the Supreme Court upheld by a vote of
six to three.'96 The Court upheld this remedy because of a compelling
interest it found in protecting "both the secrecy of information important
to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential
to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service."' 9 7 A con-
structive trust is more typically used to recover sums gained by an em-
ployee who actually breaches a fiduciary obligation by revealing classified
189. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
190. Id. at 507-08.
191. FRANK W. SNEPP, DECENT INTERVAL: AN INSIDER'S AccOUNT OF SAIGON'S INDE-
CENT END (1977).
192. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510; id. at 516 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 507.
194. Id. at 509.
195. United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 936 (4th Cir. 1979) rev'd per curiam, 444 U.S.
507 (1980).
196. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 514-16. Justice Stevens wrote a dissent in which Justices Brennan
and Marshall joined. Id. at 516-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 509 n.3 (emphasis added).
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information.19 But in contracts affecting foreign intelligence, the strong
interest in the appearance of confidentiality allowed the use of the remedy
even though there had been no breach of the actual obligation. The
Court held that a suit for punitive damages, which might be a more nor-
mal remedy for such a breach, would not suffice in this context because
such a suit might require further revelations of government secrets dur-
ing the course of litigation.199 The Court's per curiam opinion recog-
nized that the constructive trust was being imposed more for its deterrent
effect on future oath-breakers than as a remedy for the Government's
actual damage.2°
Snepp is an odd decision, one that has been much criticized.20 1 Per-
haps because the case was decided on a conditional cross-petition for cer-
tiorari,2 2 without full briefing of the issues, the opinion seems to take
little notice of the weighty First Amendment interests involved. 20 3 The
case might be read as having narrow application to the area of foreign
intelligence and national security secrecy; under such a reading, its appli-
cation would be restricted to former government employees who have
signed secrecy agreements. However, there is evidence that the executive
branch has read it more broadly, as permitting a wide range of restraints
on employee expression, whether imposed by agreement or otherwise.2°
Certainly the language of Snepp is broad enough that a subsequent Court
could use it as the basis for a holding favorable to "Son of Sam" laws-
particularly when combined with the venerable legal principle embodied
198. Id. at 515.
199. Id. at 514.
200. "[Als a practical matter, [the Fourth Circuit's decision allowing tort recovery rather
than constructive trust] may well leave the Government with no reliable deterrent against
similar breaches of security.... Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those
who would place sensitive information at risk." Id. at 514-15 (emphasis added).
201. See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking Free-
dom of Expression for Government Employees and the Public Right of Access to Government
Information, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 690, 693-98, 703-04, 713-19 (1984) (arguing that Snepp
permits excessive executive secrecy); Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court 1979 Term-Fore-
word: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8-11 (criticizing the
Snepp Court's summary treatment of the case); Diane F. Orentlicher, Comment, Snepp v.
United States" The CIA Secrecy Agreement and the First Amendment, 81 COLUM. L. REv.
662, 685-706 (1981) (criticizing the Snepp Court's failure to consider fully the First Amend-
ment implications of the case).
202. Certiorari was granted in the per curiam opinion. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507.
203. For a defense of "the free flow of unclassified information," see id. at 520 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
204. See Cheh, supra note 201, at 695-96 (commenting that President Reagan's directive in
the wake of Snepp "extend[ed] the use of prepublication review agreements to the entire execu-
tive branch"). For a discussion of recent federal legislation imposing sweeping financial re-
strictions on public employee expression, see infra note 320.
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in Riggs v. Palmer.2 °5
Riggs was cited by the Second Circuit majority in the Wiseguy case
as a major precedent for the proposition that "the state has a very strong
interest in preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes. 20 6
Riggs is also one of the most cited cases in the history of American
law.20 7 Riggs concerned a sixteen-year-old youth who, learning that his
grandfather was considering disinheriting him, killed the old man before
he could change his will. 20 8 The boy then claimed his legacy, and the
New York Court of Appeals could find no explicit provision in the stat-
ute disallowing the explicit bequest.209 The court nevertheless held that
the statute involved should be read in terms of its purpose: "to enable
testators to dispose of their estates to the objects of their bounty at death,
and to carry into effect their final wishes legally expressed. 21° The court
reasoned that
it could never have been [the drafters'] intention that a donee
who murdered the testator to make the will operative should
have any benefit under it. If such a case had been present to
their minds, and it had been supposed necessary to make some
provision of law to meet it, it cannot be doubted that they
would have provided for it. It is a familiar canon of construc-
tion that a thing which is within the intention of the makers of
a statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the
letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not
within the statute, unless it be within the intention of the mak-
ers. The writers of laws do not always express their intention
perfectly, but either exceed it or fall short of it, so that judges
are to collect it from probable or rational conjectures only, and
this is called rational interpretation ....211
Applying "rational interpretation" to the statutes governing wills,
the court reasoned that laws that were designed to further the "orderly,
peaceable and just devolution of property" 212 could not have been in-
tended to reward those who brought them into operation by violence.213
The court added:
205. 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
206. Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 782 (citing Riggs, 115 N.Y. at 511-12, 22 N.E. at 190).
207. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
38, 44 (Ronald Dworkin ed., 1977). For a spirited reply to Dworkin's analysis of Riggs, see
George C. Christie, The Model of Principles, 1968 DUKE L.J. 649, 660-62.
208. Riggs, 115 N.Y. at 508-09, 22 N.E. at 188-89.
209. Id. at 509, 22 N.E. at 189.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 511, 22 N.E. at 190.
213. Id.
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Besides, all laws as well as all contracts may be controlled
in their operation and effect by general, fundamental maxims of
the common law. No one shall be permitted to profit by his
own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found
any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his
own crime.214
The bequest to the defendant only became operative because "by his
crime [he] made it speak and have operation.... Shall he acquire title by
murdering [the victim]?"2 Accordingly, the court held, "by reason of
the crime of murder committed upon the grandfather [Riggs] is deprived
of any interest in the estate left by him." '216
Riggs, although a century old, remains good law and is an important
precedent in the law of constructive trusts. 217 It is powerful in part be-
cause it embodies an intuitively appealing idea of natural justice. The
other case relied upon by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the
Wiseguy case, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,21 is exactly
100 years younger. Though the court cited Caplin only as authority for
the general principle of Riggs,219 it in fact provides powerful evidence
that the current Supreme Court is prepared to apply the principle that no
one should profit by his own wrong even when such application burdens
explicit constitutional guarantees.
Caplin challenged the constitutionality of a federal statute authoriz-
ing forfeiture to the government of "property constituting, or derived
from... proceeds... obtained" from violations of federal drug laws.220
The defendant in a drug case paid his lawyers with funds later subjected
to an order of forfeiture; the attorneys challenged the order on grounds
that it impermissibly burdened the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The Court granted the argument that such a forfeiture did burden that
right, but rejected the constitutional challenge nonetheless. 22' The bur-
den on the right was tolerable, the Court held, because the forfeiture
advanced three specific important governmental interests: first, it raised
"substantial" sums of money for the use of law enforcement authori-
ties;2  second, it permitted assets to be held for claims of restitution;223
214. Id.
215. Id. at 512-13, 22 N.E. at 190.
216. Id. at 515, 22 N.E. at 191.
217. See, eg., GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 82, 296 n.4 (6th ed. 1987).
218. 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
219. Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 782 (citing Caplin, 491 U.S. at 629).
220. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 619. The statute involved is 21 U.S.C. § 848 (Supp. V 1982).
221. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 625.
222. Id. at 629.
223. Id. at 629-30.
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and, third, it furthered the government's "legitimate interest in depriving
criminals of economic power." '224 Perhaps most interesting for its bear-
ing on the Wiseguy case, Caplin explicitly rejects the idea that the First
Amendment has a higher status as a protected liberty than does the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel:
[T]here is no ... distinction between, or hierarchy among, con-
stitutional rights. If defendants have a right to spend forfeita-
ble assets on attorney's fees, why not on exercises of the right to
speak, practice one's religion, or travel? The full exercise of
these rights, too, depends in part on one's financial where-
withal; and forfeiture, or even the threat of forfeiture, may simi-
larly prevent a defendant from enjoying those rights as fully as
he might otherwise. Nonetheless, we are not ab6ut to recognize
an antiforfeiture exception for the exercise of each such right
225
These precedents can easily combine to crete a basis on which a
Court majority could uphold the principle embodied in "Son of Sam"
laws. After all, is not Henry Hill "profiting from" his crimes when he
receives funds for the use of his story in books, on television, and in the
movies? If the government's interest in the appearance-not the sub-
stance-of confidentiality in its foreign intelligence oppration is substan-
tial enough to justify imposition of a constructive trust on the proceeds of
a book that does not contain any classified material; is not the substantial
interest in victim compensation sufficient to trigger a similar remedy226
against proceeds of expressive activity by criminals, even where (as in
Jean Harris's case, and many others), those expressions contain no mate-
rial that invades victims' privacy, or defames them, or violates any other
specific interest generally protectable in the law governing First Amend-
ment speech? If the law has an interest in preventing drug lords from
using wealth acquired by their illegal conduct, does it not have a similar
interest in preventing murderers and other criminals from amassing
wealth from the sale of their stories? And if that interest can trump the
Sixth Amendment right to retain counsel, why can it not likewise trump
the First Amendment right of speech, or even bf press?
Accordingly, it is possible to imagine the Court holding roughly as
224. Id. at 630.
225. Id. at 628 (emphasis added). The Caplin holding sparked a bitter dissent by Justice
Blackmun, with whom Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined. Id. at 635-56 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). The dissenters insisted that the law should have been construed to avoid
burdening the right to counsel, id. at 636-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and that the majority
had inadequately measured the extent of that right, id. at 644-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
226. Or the identical one. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(b) (West 1991) (subjecting proceeds
of expressive activity by convicted felons to "an involuntary trust" for the benefit of victims).
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follows: Because a "Son of Sam" law is narrowly tailored to compensate
victims and to prevent criminals from profiting from their crimes and
accumulating economic power because of their criminal activity, a care-
fully drawn statute providing adequate due process safeguards that se-
questers the proceeds to the criminal of expressive activity and under
certain circumstances forfeits them to the state does not violate the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and press.
But that such a holding is possible does not mean that it is correct or
wise. In fact, the Court's own precedents in the First Amendment area
suggest that, even after confronting the conflicting appeal of the moral
issues involved in criminal speech, it should most logically choose to vin-
dicate the free speech interests involved in the Wiseguy case. Faced with
the necessity of choosing between the broader principles implied by the
language and history of the First Amendment and those implied by Riggs
and Caplin, the Court would do better to favor the former.
VI. FLAWS IN THE NEW YORK LAW: ELEMENTS
OF A NARROW HOLDING
As mentioned above, the general question of "Son of Sam" laws pits
two powerful principles against each other: freedom of speech, on the
one hand, against the moral revulsion felt by society against those who
break the law and then profit by writing or speaking about it. Because of
the necessity of framing the case around a specific statute, these issues
may be explored only obliquely during the Wiseguy litigation. It is en-
tirely foreseeable that, faced with a specific case challenging a specific
"Son of Sam" statute, the Supreme Court might wish to issue as narrow
a holding as possible, so that the broader issues could await a later deci-
sion and more useful briefing. In this section, I argue that the circum-
stances of the Wiseguy case and the defects of the New York law
combine to offer the Court ample grounds on which to base such a nar-
row holding if it chooses to do so. I argue that the New York statute is
overbroad. Further, it impermissibly burdens interests protected by the
Press Clause of the First Amendment-specifically, by imposing a form
of prior restraint or impermissible licensing on publishers. It also vio-
lates clear Supreme Court precedents invalidating financial regulations
aimed either at the press generally or at specific segments of the press
distinguished from others by the content of the material they convey.
Overbreadth is a doctrine the Court uses to permit challenges to
laws that infringe on First Amendment interests even by those whose
conduct might validly be regulated under more stringently drawn stat-
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utes.2 27 The Court in recent years has required that overbreadth be "sub-
stantial" before it can invalidate statutes that restrict "conduct [that]-
even if expressive-falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal
laws."22 Nevertheless, the Court recognizes that overbreadth analysis is
appropriate when applied to laws that target speech, even when such
speech is sought to be limited in the interest of criminal law enforcement.
Thus, in City of Houston v. Hill,22 9 the Court held that Houston police
had violated the civil rights of the plaintiff when they arrested him for
attempting to distract a police officer, who was questioning another man,
by shouting, "Why don't you pick on somebody your own size?"230 The
plaintiff had been charged under a statute making it an offense to "will-
fully or intentionally interrupt[ ] a policeman.., by verbal challenge
during an investigation."23' The Court invalidated the statute, not be-
cause the city could not prevent individuals from obstructing police of-
ficers, but because this formulation vested police officers with too much
discretion,232 and because no limiting construction could be found that
would prevent it from being "susceptible of regular application to pro-
tected expression. '
The Wiseguy case also concerns a very broad statute restricting the
ability of individuals to engage in a number of expressive activities, rang-
ing from the most salacious exploitation of vile crimes to the measured
and sober defense of civil disobedience. Charles Manson, if he were in
New York, would indeed be prevented from collecting proceeds derived
from selling his story of slaughtering Sharon Tate; however, the statute
by its terms also would restrict not only Thoreau and King234 but also
Gandhi and Socrates from discussing their illegal activities. Indeed,
while the State could not punish the defendant in City of Houston for
interrupting a police officer who was trying to make an arrest, it might,
had it had a "Son of Sam" law at the time, have been able to sequester
funds earned by him for writing an article defending his decision to do
SO.
Moreover, the New York statute by its terms applies to all revenues
227. See Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980); Dombrowski
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940).
228. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
229. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
230. Id. at 453-54.
231. Id. at 454.
232. Id. at 465-67.
233. Id. at 467.
234. See supra text accompanying note 186. Note also that § 632-a invests the Board with
broad discretion to apply the statute to specific projects or to exempt them from its operation.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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from a media project, no matter how little of its content might concern
the crime that triggered the statute's application. It is difficult to imagine
a limiting judicial construction that would obviate these problems; a judi-
cial construction that required, for example, that the predicate crime be a
serious or violent one would not prevent the law from chilling protected
expression, since much political advocacy involves discussion of crimes
deemed violent by society.235 Similarly, a construction that required that
discussion of the predicate crime occupy the majority or a substantial
part of the work's content before the statute could apply would simply
enmesh the Crime Victims Board, and the courts, more deeply in con-
tent-based judgments about specific expressive projects. The Court
would be well within its own precedents if it struck down the law as
overbroad.
Secondly, Supreme Court precedent suggests that section 632-a vio-
lates the First Amendment's Press Clause specifically.236 To begin with,
the statute subjects media outlets, which are protected by the Press
Clause as well as the Speech Clause of the First Amendment, to a form of
regulation that combines elements of classic prior restraint with elements
of the licensing system abandoned in England in 1694.237 Those who do
not comply, either intentionally or inadvertently, then find themselves
subject to economic penalties that resemble the special taxes on the press
that the Court has repeatedly invalidated.238
The prior restraint part of the statutory scheme, of course, is its
requirement that media outlets contracting with criminal defendants sub-
235. See, eg., infra note 326 and accompanying text (discussing self-defense claims of
abused wives who harm or kill their abusers).
236. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom... of the press...." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. It has been argued that the separate mention of the press in the Amend-
ment's text represents "an acknowledgment of the critical role played by the press in American
society." Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring). This tex-
tual acknowledgment, it is suggested, requires "sensitivity" to the "special needs" of the insti-
tutional press. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Others, however, have contended that the
Constitution does not mandate any special institutional privilege for the press. See, e.g., First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
237. See WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 62 &
n.44 (1984).
238. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 223, 234 (1987) (invali-
dating sales tax imposed on general interest magazines but not applied to newspapers or to
religious, professional, trade, or sports journals), discussed infra notes 245-48 and accompany-
ing text; Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
577-79 (1983) (holding that tax on publications was invalid even though the tax was based not
on content but rather on the revenues of the publications within its purview), discussed infra
notes 249-55 and accompanying text; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245-48
(1936) (recounting the history of special taxation of the press in England and America, and
suggesting that such taxation was an abuse the framers of the First Amendment intended to
prevent).
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mit the contracts for review by the Board.239 Such review, particularly
when prolonged, might delay arrangements to publicize a criminal's
story until it was no longer timely. The Court has held that "prior re-
straints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tol-
erable infringement[s] of First Amendment rights,"2' particularly when
applied to "reporting of criminal proceedings." 41 The presumption
against prior restraint applies even when the restraint is temporary.242
Advance review by an administrative body with broad powers to
make content-based determinations that may impose costs on both par-
ties to the contract also smacks of systems that require publishers to ob-
tain a license before publishing or circulating a work or publication.
Such schemes have been struck down where, as here, the scheme is "di-
rected narrowly at expression or conduct commonly associated with ex-
pression" and "creates an agency... charged particularly with reviewing
speech .. .breeding an 'expertise' tending to favor censorship over
239. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982). In the case before the Court,
[t]he Board commenced its inquiry by delivery of letters to Simon & Schuster and
author Pileggi which sought, inter alia, copies of "all ... contracts or agreements"
either Simon & Schuster or Pileggi may have entered into with any person "who has
been accused or convicted of a crime," the name of any such person, a "description,
location, and dates of crimes committed," and any amounts paid to such person.
These sweeping demands required Simon & Schuster to review all of its thousands of
contracts, and sought to conscript Simon & Schuster into laying bare any informa-
tion it might have on the past criminal activity of any of its authors or primary
soutces, and were not limited to Wiseguy.
Brief for the Petitioner at 8-9, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., No. 90-1059 (U.S. filed Apr. 19, 1991). Such administrative demands for media
self-policing plainly entail, at the least, the imposition of an economic disincentive imposed on
media outlets who engage in certain expressive activities. Such disincentives were disapproved
in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57 (1974) (holding law requir-
ing newspapers to print replies to unfavorable articles invalid under the First Amendment
because, inter alia, it "exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper... in terms
of the cost in printing and composing time and materials and in taking up space that could be
devoted to other material the newspaper may have preferred to print").
240. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
241. Id. This doctrine sheds light on the holding in Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis
that submission to the Board for review could not be avoided even by basing the parts of the
book arguably subject to the statute entirely on the transcript of the defendant's trial. See
Children of Bedford, 143 Misc. 2d 999, 1003, 541 N.Y.S.2d 894, 897-98 (Sup. Ct. 1989), aff'd,
161 A.D.2d 503, 556 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1990) (mem.), aff'd, 77 N.Y.2d 713, 573 N.E.2d 541, 570
N.Y.S.2d 453 (1991).
242. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 560; see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (refusing to enjoin temporarily publication to permit review of
"Pentagon Papers" material to assess effect on national security). But see Morland v.
Sprecher, 443 U.S. 709, 711 (per curiam) (declining to disturb district court's preliminary
injunction against publication of an article allegedly revealing "secrets" of construction of hy-
drogen bomb), denying mandamus to United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 994
(W.D. Wis. 1979).
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speech.,243
In addition to the possibility that the Board might exercise imper-
missible prior restraint, the New York scheme also has the potential, as
shown in the Wiseguy case, of subjecting certain media outlets to double
liability-when the Board rules that a contract not submitted to it should
be covered by section 632-a, it may order the publisher to pay to the
Board an amount equal to all sums previously paid to the defendant if
such sums are not recoverable from the defendant. Such a liability provi-
sion contravenes the Court's established precedent that the press may not
be singled out for taxation.2" This doctrine has been applied both when
(as in the New York scheme) the financial liability is imposed on certain
media outlets because of the content they convey and when the tax is
applied to the press, but only the press, as a whole.
Thus, in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland24 5 the Court in-
validated a sales tax imposed on general interest magazines but not ap-
plied to newspapers or to religious, professional, trade, or sports
journals.246 In an opinion by Justice Marshall, the Court held that the
tax must fall even though the record showed "no evidence of an im-
proper censorial motive."247 The tax was flawed because
the basis on which Arkansas differentiates between magazines
is particularly repugnant to First Amendment principles: a
magazine's tax status depends entirely on its content.... Such
official scrutiny of the content of publications as the basis for
imposing a tax is entirely incompatible with the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of freedom of the press.248
243. Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760 (1988). Lakewood in-
volved an ordinance requiring newspapers to reapply annually for permission to place vending
machines on municipal property, id. at 753, thus making the case one where the stated aim
was, as in victim compensation schemes, not to censor speech but to further a nonspeech-
related aim. See id. at 753-54 (ordinance focused on machines' design and indemnification of
the city for any liability incident to the presence of machines). Lakewood was a 4-3 decision;
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy did not take part. Id. at 752.
244. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 223, 234 (1987), dis-
cussed infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text; Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minne-
sota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 577-79 (1983), discussed infra notes 249-55 and
accompanying text.
245. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
246. Id. at 223, 234.
247. Id. at 228.
248. Id. at 229-30 (citations omitted). Ragland was a 6-1-2 decision. Justice Stevens con-
curred in the judgment, but argued that government has broader power to restrict expression
than the majority would allow. Id. at 234-35 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing that, absent a
.,significant coercive effect," or a legislative intent to produce such an effect, the case should
have been considered as a governmental refusal to grant an exemption to a generally applicable
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The Court also has invalidated a tax aimed at publications even
though it was not based on content but rather on the revenues of the
publications within its purview. At issue in Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue 249 was a state use tax on ink
and paper used in the production of publications. These items were the
only components of retail goods taxed in Minnesota, and the tax was
further structured to exempt all but large newspapers from any actual
liability.250 The Court declined to rule such a tax automatically inva-
lid,251 but held that such a tax could not be sustained unless justified by
"a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance"252 that could not
be realized by "alternative means of achieving the same interest without
raising concerns under the First Amendment. ' 253 In Minneapolis Star
such an interest could not be shown, and the tax fell even though the
record did not disclose improper legislative motives.25 4 In her opinion
for the Court, Justice O'Connor relied heavily on arguments by oppo-
nents of the ratification of the Constitution that a bill of rights would be
needed to protect the press from ruinous taxation by the federal
government.2 5
The New York law does not single out the press as a whole for a
definite but potentially punitive tax, but instead imposes contingent fi-
nancial penalties on certain media outlets based on their editorial deci-
sions. Those that do not contract to pay defendants to explain their
"thoughts, feelings,... or emotions' 256 are free to express whatever, and
as much as, they choose about the subject of crimes within the Board's
sales tax and as such should have been judged by different standards than those applied to
"direct restriction[s] or prohibition[s]" aimed at the press. Id. at 237 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
249. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
250. Id. at 577-78.
251. Id. at 579-80. In Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), Justice Suth-
erland's opinion for a unanimous Court rehearses much of the history of special taxation of the
press in England and the colonies, suggesting that such taxation was an abuse the framers of
the First Amendment must have intended to prevent. Id. at 245-48. Nevertheless, the Minne-
apolis Star Court declined to invalidate all taxes on the press on the strength of Grosjean,
arguing that the Court's holding in the latter case was shaped by the fact that the tax invali-
dated had been imposed by the machine of Louisiana Senator Huey P. Long for the purpose of
penalizing daily newspapers that opposed his radical political program. Minneapolis Star, 460
U.S. at 579-80.
252. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585.
253. Id. at 586.
254. Id. at 592.
255. See id. at 584 (citing writings of Richard Henry Lee and Melancton Smith). Both the
partial concurrence by Justice White, id. at 593 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), and the dissent by then-Justice Rehnquist, id. at 596 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (focusing
on the majority's refusal to examine how much actual burden the tax imposed on the press.
256. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(l) (McKinney 1982).
1992]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
jurisdiction-including reenactments or recreations of the most sangui-
nary and distasteful kind. Those outlets that present the defendant's
point of view may find themselves with significant and unpredictable fi-
nancial liability to the State, depending on the Board's discretion and
their own skill in interpreting the statute. Under such circumstances, the
statute certainly seems to constitute a selective, content-based financial
penalty directed at the press, bringing it within the ambit of Ragland and
Minneapolis Star.
Thus, the manifest sloppiness of the New York drafters affords the
Court many options for invalidating this statute as applied in this case
without prejudging the larger question of whether the general run of stat-
utes aimed at criminal expression for profit should be constitutionally
tolerated. The flaws in the New York scheme-in particular, is target-
ing of publishers rather than criminals themselves-might be considered
to have muddied the issues sufficiently that briefing and argumentation of
the case had not engaged the central issue. A narrow holding would
permit the nation's publishing industry to operate free of sweeping re-
strictions, while preserving for another time the question of whether a
more narrowly drawn statute can survive judicial scrutiny.
However, there is also ample precedent from which to argue that all
such laws, even those more carefully drafted than New York's, are un-
constitutional and should be declared so.
VII. SPEECH BY CRIMINALS: A BROAD FIRST AMENDMENT
HOLDING
To understand the full constitutional implications of the Wiseguy
case, it is necessary to imagine a statute drawn as scrupulously as possi-
ble to avoid overbreadth and Press Clause problems. First, such a statute
would have a narrow regulatory predicate: it would be aimed only at
those convicted of crime, not those merely accused, and its application
would not be triggered by any criminal conviction, but only by convic-
tion of a truly heinous crime, that is, say, by a violent felony. Second, the
law would be aimed solely at such criminals, and would not impose or
imply financial or criminal liability on publishers. Third, the law's se-
questration of profits could not be applied ex post facto or by administra-
tive action, but only after an individualized determination, made by a
court upon the motion of an adverse party and with notice to all inter-
ested parties, that the statute's terms applied to monies from a specific
expressive project by a specific criminal. Finally, the bill would sequester
profits from an affected project only for the purpose of compensating
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individual victims who obtained civil judgments; there would be no for-
feiture of profits to the state treasury or to a general crime victims' fund.
Such a statute would pose the constitutional question in its sharpest
terms: is it permissible for a legislative body to enact a law that targets
the profits from expressive activity for differential, and harsher, treat-
ment as part of a scheme of victim compensation? Put more simply, may
the state target the profits of First Amendment activities, and those prof-
its only, to further that aim?
The Court's First Amendment precedents most strongly suggest
that the answer to these questions is no. In brief, the Court has repeat-
edly held that speech about crime and criminal justice is protected by the
First Amendment.2" 7 Consequently, statutes like "Son of Sam" laws that
restrict or unfavorably treat speech based on its content are subject to
strict scrutiny.2" 8 The Court has also held that speech may not be sup-
pressed because the speaker is someone whom the state asserts a special
interest in regulating;25 9 thus, the state does not have more freedom to
restrict the speech of criminals about their crimes simply because they
are criminals. And the Court's precedents suggest that the fact that the
law does not prohibit speech by criminals, but only subjects it to content-
based economic burdens, does not exempt the measure from full First
Amendment scrutiny.co
Under this analysis, a "Son of Sam" law cannot survive unless it is
narrowly tailored to further its legitimate nonspeech-related purpose-
compensation of victims, not compensation of victims solely from the
proceeds of expressive activity. If the scrutiny is applied in those terms,
the law cannot survive, because it is so ineffective in pursuing that pur-
257. See infra notes 270-79 and accompanying text.
258. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (barring state
from making it a tort for journalists to disclose the names of rape victims when those names
were learned from court records), discussed infra notes 270-76 and accompanying text; Win-
ters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 508 (1948) (voiding on vagueness grounds state statute that
made it a misdemeanor to sell or possess publications principally composed of crime stories),
discussed infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text. The "strict scrutiny" test means that
courts must determine whether a content-based restriction on speech is "necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and ... is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981). In such an examination, the burden is on the government to prove
the legitimacy of the state interest asserted. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786
(1978). Courts must scrutinize carefully the government's asserted justification for a content-
based restriction. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980). The presumption is against
an asserted interest, though some interests may be found "so compelling that where no ade-
quate alternatives exist" a content-based restriction may be upheld. Id. at 465.
259. See infra notes 280-82 and accompanying text.
260. See infra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
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pose as to raise the question of whether the stated purpose is a mere
pretext for a speech-suppressing law.
Though the Supreme Court has never had occasion to decide the
constitutionality of a law aimed directly at limiting criminals from selling
commercial fights to reenact their crimes, the Court has, remarkably
enough, considered a case that centered on the power of states to restrict
commercial reenactments of crime. The case, decided in 1967, was Time,
Inc. v. Hill.261 In that case, a family sued Life magazine under a New
York privacy statute that forbade invading the privacy of individuals by
commercial appropriation of name or likeness. 2 62 The family had been
held hostage by escaped convicts some years before, and their experience
had been fictionalized by a playwright under the title The Desperate
Hours.263 When the play opened, Life editors decided to take actors
from the cast to the house where the family had lived and have them
"reenact" the family's ordeal by posing in scenes of brutality from the
play.2" However, Life negligently failed to check its own files, which
would have shown that the real convicts, unlike the fictional ones, had
not brutalized and degraded the hostages they held.265 Despite the mag-
azine's negligence, the Court held that the First Amendment, and the
principles of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,266 precluded the applica-
tion of the statute to invasions of privacy unless they were committed
with actual knowledge of their falsity or recklessness as to falsity. 267 The
Time majority called the events depicted in the play "matter[s] of public
interest" '268 and stated that "[t]he guarantees for speech and press are not
the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, es-
sential as those are to healthy government. '269
More recently, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,27° the Court has
been even more solicitous of speech about "[t]he commission of crime,
prosecutions resulting from it, and judicial proceedings arising from the
prosecutions. ' 271 In Cox Broadcasting, the Court barred the state of
261. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
262. Id. at 381; see N.Y. CiV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1991).
263. Time, 385 U.S. at 377.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 378.
266. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
267. Time, 385 U.S. at 387-88.
268. Id. at 388.
269. Id. Justice Fortas dissented on the grounds that speech reenacting crimes is "not
within the specially protected core of the First Amendment." Id. at 420 (Fortas, J.,
dissenting).
270. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
271. Id. at 492.
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Georgia from making it a tort for journalists to disclose the name of rape
victims when those names were learned from court records.272 The stat-
utory tort was disallowed because it "imposes sanctions on pure expres-
sion-the content of a publication-and not conduct or a combination of
speech and nonspeech elements that might otherwise be open to regula-
tion or prohibition.""7 3 Though the case turned largely on the need for
free dissemination of information in public records,27" the Court explic-
itly considered restrictions on speech in relation to the rights of crime
victims: in Cox Broadcasting, the protected victim interest was privacy,
an interest the Court strongly endorsed 275 but did not allow to trump the
rights protected by the First Amendment. 276
The Court protected speech about crime even at a time when it was
generally less solicitous about the rights of speech and press than it is
today. In Winters v. New York2 7 7 Justice Reed, writing for the majority,
voided on vagueness grounds a New York statute that made it a misde-
meanor to sell or possess publications" 'principally made up of criminal
news, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories
of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime.' "278 Though the case did not turn
on First Amendment grounds, the Court noted that, even though states
had an important interest in
minimiz[ing] all incentives to crime .... [w]e do not accede to
[the State's] suggestion that the constitutional protection for a
free press applies only to the exposition of ideas. The line be-
tween the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the
protection of that basic right. Everyone is familiar with in-
stances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man's
amusement, teaches another's doctrine. Though we can see
nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines,
272. Id. at 491.
273. Id. at 495.
274. See id. at 495; see also id. at 497 (Powell, J., concurring) ("TIhe First Amendment
proscribes imposition of civil liability in a privacy action predicated on the truthful publication
of matters contained in open judicial records."). Then-Justice Rehnquist dissented, but only
on the issue of whether the decision below represented a final action ripe for appellate review.
Id. at 501 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
275. See id. at 487-89.
276. Id. at 485.
277. 333 U.S. 507 (1948). A plurality of the Court recently cited Winters as authority that
"First Amendment protection is in no way limited to controversial topics or emotionally
charged issues." Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950, 1960 (1991) (plurality
opinion).
278. Winters, 333 U.S. at 508 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1141(2) (Thompson 1939)).
Odd as such a statute may seem today, at the time of Winters at least 20 states had these laws,
id. at 522-23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and they were a much more clearly accepted part of
the legal system than are "Son of Sam" laws today.
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they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the
best of literature.279
Thus, a holding by the present Court that speech is less strongly
protected because it concerns crime would represent a significant depar-
ture from its own precedent. Is there, then, any reason to protect speech
less strongly because it comes from a criminal? The Court has often re-
jected the idea that First Amendment protections weaken depending on
the identity of the speaker. In First National Bank v. Bellotti280 the
Court invalidated a state statute that banned corporations from publicly
addressing the merits of questions put to the public by referendum on
possible constitutional amendments.281 That the speaker was a corpora-
tion-a creature of the state and subject to a variety of controls not appli-
cable to individuals-did not mean that its First Amendment interests
could be outweighed by less weighty interests than would have to be as-
serted to trump an individual's First Amendment right of free speech,
the Court held: "The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capac-
ity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual. '282 Thus,
that the writer is a criminal, or that the writing is about crime, does not
necessarily reduce the level of First Amendment scrutiny to be applied to
a model "Son of Sam" law. Indeed, precedent suggests that the scrutiny
should be even higher in "Son of Sam" cases because the restriction in
279. Id. at 510 (citations omitted). The present debate is illuminated by comparing the
majority opinion with Justice Frankfurter's dissent, which heatedly argues that all such
magazines may be banned as "incitements to crime." Id. at 527 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Justice Frankfurter, without using the term, judged the law under the more or less pure "bad
tendency" test: "No one would deny, I assume, that New York may punish crimes of lust and
violence. Presumably also, it may take appropriate measures to lower the crime rate." Id. at
526 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The First Amendment would protect the magazines if they
were "[w]holly neutral futilities," but did not protect those adjudged by the legislature as
capable of "mischief." Id. at 528 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
280. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
281. Id. at 795.
282. Id. at 777. Bellotti was a 5-4 decision. Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall would
have upheld the statute as a valid exercise of the state's power to supervise corporate steward-
ship of the shareholders' assets and because speech by a corporation is not a "manifestation of
individual freedom or choice." Id. at 804-05 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist dis-
sented separately, arguing that, having created a corporation by legislative act, a state should
be free to restrict its speech to matters necessary for the corporation's function. Id. at 823-25
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The Court also has declined to permit greater restrictions on First Amendment rights
simply because individuals are students, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 506-14 (1969), or public employees, Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
572-75 (1968). But see Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam) (constructive
trust applied to proceeds of book by former CIA employee because of violation of prepublica-
tion review agreement). For a more detailed examination of Snepp, see supra notes 189-204
and accompanying text.
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question is directed at some, but not all, speech by criminals, and because
the law discriminates on the basis of the content of the speech.283 Works
of autobiography that do not mention crime, works of social advocacy
purged of any mention of the criminal's own misdeeds, volumes of verse,
moral theology, or fiction do not fall within the law's restrictions; only
expressive projects that reenact the crime or discuss the criminal's reac-
tions to it are affected. 84 Such content-based restrictions have received a
very cold reception from the Court in previous cases. In Regan v. Time,
Inc. 285 the Court invalidated a federal statute that allowed the reproduc-
tion of U.S. currency "'for philatelic, numismatic, educational, histori-
cal, or newsworthy purposes,' "286 while denying permission to
publications whose purposes were considered to be otherwise.2" Justice
White wrote that "[r]egulations which permit the Government to dis-
criminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated
under the First Amendment. 288
Similarly, in FCC v. League of Women Voters289 the Court set aside
a ban by the Federal Communications Commission on editorializing by
broadcast stations funded by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting290
because the "ban [was] defined solely on the basis of the content of the
suppressed speech ' 29 1 and attempted to "limit discussion of controversial
topics and thus to shape the agenda for public debate." '29 2 In Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission29 the Court struck down
a state administrative rule banning regulated utilities from inserting into
their bills mailings about political matters.294 This regulation, like the
one in "Son of Sam" laws, was viewpoint neutral; neutrality did not save
it, however, because to allow "prohibition of public discussion of an en-
283. See infra notes 285-95 and accompanying text.
284. The content restrictions in New York's law are broad enough, however, that John
Ehrlichman's first novel, THE COMPANY (1976), which seems to present his own view of how
the Watergate scandal took place, might be affected. Of course, his nonfiction work, WITNESS
TO POWER: THE NIXON YEARS (1982), would likely be affected by such a law. Works by
participants who admit crimes are, of course, a major, if not the major, source of historical
information about the Watergate scandal.
285. 468 U.S. 641 (1984).
286. Id. at 644 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 504(1) (1958)).
287. Id. at 650, 652.
288. Id. at 648-49 (citations omitted).
289. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
290. Id. at 366-73.
291. Id. at 383.
292. Id. at 384. The content basis of the regulation was one of "two central features" on
which the Court based its holding; the other was that the ban targeted editorial opinion. Id. at
381.
293. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
294. Id. at 532-33.
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tire topic .... would be to allow [the] government control over the
search for political truth." '295
Thus, the First Amendment case law looks harshly at such restric-
tions and does not relax its presumptive disapproval merely because they
restrict speech by criminals about crime. But most of the cases cited
above concern government attempts to stop or ban speech altogether.
Can the "Son of Sam" law nonetheless claim a more lenient standard of
review on the ground that it does not ban speech, but merely alters its
profit-making potential? 96 The recent case of Meyer v. Grant297 suggests
that it cannot.
Meyer concerned a Colorado statute that made it a criminal offense
to pay solicitors for seeking signatures on petitions aimed at placing pro-
posed amendments to the state constitution on the ballot.298  The
Supreme Court invalidated the statute because it "limit[ed] the number
of voices who will convey appellees' message... and, therefore, limit[ed]
the size of the audience they can reach," thus producing "the inevitable
effect of reducing the total quantum of speech on a public issue. '299
295. Id. at 537-38. The Court in Consolidated Edison relied on the broad language of Po-
lice Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). See Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 537-38 (quoting
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96). In Mosley, the Court invalidated a city ordinance that banned all
picketing near schools except "peaceful picketing" pursuant to a "labor dispute." Mosley, 408
U.S. at 92-94. Justice Marshall wrote that
above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. To
permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfill-
ment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought,
free from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content
control. Any restriction on expressive activity because of its content would com-
pletely undercut the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."
Id. at 95-96 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)) (citations
omitted).
296. The district court in the Wiseguy case relied on this distinction in holding that § 632-a
does not "abridge" protected speech. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
297. 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
298. Id. at 415-16.
299. Id. at 422-23. The Court quoted the Colorado Supreme Court's admission, while con-
sidering a different challenge to the statute, that " '[w]e can take judicial notice of the fact that
it is often more difficult to get people to work without compensation than it is to get them to
work for pay.'" Id. at 423 (quoting Urevich v. Woodard, 667 P.2d 760, 763 (Colo. 1983)). It
is similarly more difficult to get criminals, agents, ghost writers, and other literary profession-
als to work when payday may be delayed for five years--or may never come at all. Many
other cases recognize the intimate relationship between speaking freely and being able to pay
or receive money for speech. See, eg., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (recognizing
that federal restrictions on expenditure of personal funds by political candidates and by in-
dependent organizations violate First Amendment). However, a number of the justices, led by
Justice Stevens, have advanced an argument that speech can, in essence, be "graded" in degree
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Thus, the Court's previous cases suggest that the proponents of any
"Son of Sam" law-even one narrowly drawn to avoid offending the
Press Clause-must meet an exacting test: the law must be narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest. In this case,
content-based, expression-selective statutes cannot pass such a test when
the question is properly posed.
The interest asserted is the compensation of victims. But the stat-
utes do little to advance that interest, and arguably retard it.3°° Return
of First Amendment protection for purposes of economic regulation that burdens but does not
prohibit the speech. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), Justice Stevens
wrote a plurality opinion upholding the constitutionality of a Detroit ordinance that ordered
"adult" theaters to be widely dispersed, thereby making it more difficult and costly to find a
suitable site for such a theater. Id. at 72-73 (plurality opinion). The plurality found this not to
be an "impermissible restraint," id. at 62 (plurality opinion), even though it involved a con-
tent-based determination, id. at 66 (plurality opinion). While noting that erotic material could
not be suppressed entirely, the plurality said that
it is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly
different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate that
inspired Voltaire's immortal comment [that he might deplore a speaker's words but
would defend to the death the speaker's right to say them].... [Flew of us would
march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Speci-
fied Sexual Activities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice.
Id. at 70 (plurality opinion). On the other hand, Justice Powell, who provided the fifth vote to
uphold the ordinance, did so on the grounds that the ordinance was not content-based at all,
but was motivated by concern for the "effects" (such as urban blight and crime) of concentra-
tion of "adult" theaters. Id. at 81 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring). The "effects" rationale seemed
important in the reasoning of the six-member majority that upheld a similar ordinance in City
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986). Intriguingly, Justice Souter
adopted the same rationale in his concurrence with the Court's judgment upholding Indiana's
state law banning public nudity as applied to nude dancing. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111
S. Ct. 2456, 2468-71 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).
The American Mini Theatres analysis might be applied to speech by criminals about their
crimes-protecting such speech probably would not, at first impression, strike anyone as the
reason why the United States fought the Persian Gulf War. Even if the "lesser protection"
rationale is adopted, however, speech by criminals about their crimes is significantly closer to
"untrammeled political debate" than are most commercial X-rated fims. See infra notes 324-
27 and accompanying text. Further, the test of whether we would, at any given moment,
sacrifice a son or daughter to defend a specific liberty, despite a certain brass-tacks analytical
rigor, surely cannot exhaust the constitutional inquiry about the vitality of a guaranteed free-
dom (after all, one of the functions of the First Amendment, as contemporaneously inter-
preted, is to protect the rights of those who do not wish to march off to whatever war popular
enthusiasm may currently embrace). Many additional tests for First Amendment protection
leap to mind; one among them-though only one-is whether the Founders themselves
marched off to war to secure the threatened liberty or one analogous to it. The right of those
accused or convicted of crime to speak about their alleged offenses and the process by which
their guilt was adjudged is in fact quite close to a liberty for which the Founders fought and
which the framers of the Bill of Rights meant quite consciously to secure. See infra notes 310-
11 and accompanying text.
300. See Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 787 (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that actual operation
of § 632-a produces much less in revenue than would permissive publishing policy coupled
with neutral attachment statute). In First Amendment cases, the Court has not been loath to
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briefly to the facts of this case. Henry Hill emerged from his life of crime
with a new home, two cars, a business, and a tidy annual salary as a
government employee. 30 Despite its professed zeal to compensate the
victims of Hill's crimes,30 2 the Board has made no attempt to secure a
lien on these assets. Instead, it has focused its efforts exclusively on the
proceeds from his literary venture. Admittedly, because Hill is protected
by the Federal Witness Program, reaching his assets might be difficult,303
but the larger point is nonetheless vividly illustrated by the example:
criminals may have many assets other than proceeds from sale of their
stories; indeed, many of these assets may be direct results of their crimi-
nal activities. 3° Some portion of such assets would be reachable by
properly drawn restitution and attachment statutes, and no reasonable
person would object to a broad but properly drawn law sweeping within
its purview all assets of those whose criminal acts have made victims
suffer. If such statutes also cause some interference with a criminal's
right to enjoy literary proceeds, there could be little ground for First
Amendment complaint. That the legislatures have taken another
route-burdening expressive activity, and only such activity, with re-
strictions that seem likely to chill or extinguish it-suggests that the stat-
examine, as part of the "narrowly tailored" test, whether laws actually advance interests pos-
ited by the legislature to justify challenged enactments. See supra note 258.
301. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
302. No one has yet come forward to make a claim from the proceeds of Hill's escrow
accounts. See Hevesi, supra note 98, at B8.
303. The proper cure for this difficulty is not imposing liability on publishers, but adopting
rules that permit the satisfaction of judgments against federal witnesses while protecting their
anonymity. See generally Karen S. Cooperstein, Note, Enforcing Judgements Against Parlici-
pants in the Witness Protection Program, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1019 (1984) (proposing
changes to Witness Protection Program that would make satisfying civil judgments against
protected defendants easier). To put it more simply, it will not do for government to adopt
policies that make it difficult for citizens to vindicate their rights, and then to argue that these
very policies make it necessary that the constitutional rights of other citizens must be abridged
in order to rectify the state of affairs.
304. In his Fischetti dissent, Judge Newman reasoned that
[o]f all criminals who might be liable for restitution, many have assets independent of
the proceeds of their crimes. Crime is not exclusively an activity of the poor. And
many poor criminals whose crimes involve the taking of property have at least some
of that property available for restitution when they are arrested. Thus, I think it
unlikely that the opportunity to write about their crimes is the sole or even principal
asset of most criminals. My guess is that very few criminals have a crime story worth
selling and that their number is far less than the sum of criminals with assets in-
dependent of their crime proceeds plus impoverished criminals in possession of such
proceeds when arrested.
Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 785-86 (Newman, J., dissenting). Newman argued that, if New York's
attachment statutes currently do not reach assets of criminals, "the answer required by the
First Amendment is to broaden the remedies, not to select books about crime for special regu-
lation." Id. at 786 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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utes are not narrowly tailored. Indeed, reviewing the record, it is hard to
escape the suspicion that the victim compensation rationale is in fact at
least partly pretextual-that the real purpose of "Son of Sam" laws is the
constitutionally impermissible one of preventing distasteful books by
criminals from being written or published. That the laws' provisions and
application raise such a suspicion gives the Court ample reason to rule
that laws singling out expressive activity for stricter application of victim
compensation schemes are barred under the First Amendment.
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE CASE FOR EXTENDING PROTECTION TO
THE PROCEEDS OF SPEECH BY CRIMINALS ABOUT THEIR
CRIMES
Even though "Son of Sam" laws raise difficult and painful issues, the
right of Henry Hill and other, even less savory, criminal authors to the
proceeds of their speech is firmly rooted in the First Amendment. The
history and importance of the First Amendment suggest that it should
not be trumped by the common law interpretive principle of Riggs.305
Further, sweeping as the precedent in Caplin3 06 may seem, it does not
carry far enough to justify statutes that single out the proceeds of speech.
Lastly, speech by criminals, though it may at first glance seem to be a
minor and singularly distasteful subcategory of speech, in fact cannot be
defined in a way that would not sweep within its definition much speech
that is socially important and, indeed, close to the heart of any principled
definition of "core political speech." Accordingly, a seemingly small
criminal-speech exception to the Amendment's protections of speech
might in reality injure the Amendment's function in our constitutional
system.
To begin with, the First Amendment's guarantee of speech and
press freedom is a constitutional guarantee. As such, we should be ex-
tremely wary of varying its effect on the basis of principles of the com-
mon law. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote, "it is a constitution we are
expounding,"3 °7 not a statute or a precedent; the framers of the Constitu-
tion did intend that it should in many areas vary or supersede the com-
mon law. °8 Recall that the Riggs court considered that it was simply
305. See supra notes 205-17 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
307. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
308. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cls. 1, 2 (setting forth the limits of what conduct
may be made treasonous by statute and the evidentiary requirements for proving treason in
federal courts). "The framers of the Constitution had deliberately defined treason narrowly, in
reaction against the practice in Britain and in many European countries, where the offense had
been loosely defined to include a variety of political acts against the state." ALFRED H.
19921
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giving effect to the legislature's constructive intention-that is, that the
legislators, had they thought of it and considered it important, would
certainly have written their statute so that it stated explicitly that, under
the provisions, no one could take property whose title he would other-
wise acquire by operation of law as a direct consequence of a crime he
committed.309 Thus, the question in the Wiseguy case should be framed
in a different way: whether the framers of the First Amendment could
actually have intended it to read, "Congress shall make no law abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, except in cases in which those ac-
cused or convicted of crime wish to write or speak for money about their
alleged crimes and their trials." The history of the struggle for free
speech and press in this country suggests strongly that they would have
been wary of such a formulation.
The growth of a free press was sparked by the growth of the ability
of those who ran it to profit by its operation.3I° The framers of the First
Amendment surely understood that to permit government to attack the
press's ability to generate and control its own proceeds would vitiate se-
verely the freedom it granted. At the time of its framing, the Amend-
ment was "intended and understood to prohibit any congressional
regulation of the press, whether by means of censorship, a licensing law,
a tax, or a sedition act."31'
In addition, the concept of a free press arose in the context of re-
peated criminal prosecutions of writers and publishers.3 2 It was not un-
KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 183 (6th
ed. 1983). For a review of the role of English common-law courts in creating the broader
definition of treason the Framers were attempting to narrow, see SIR MICHAEL FOSTER, Dis-
COURSE ON HIGH TREASON (1762), reprinted in part in 4THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 415
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). In the proceedings against Aaron Burr and
his alleged co-conspirators, Chief Justice Marshall held that the narrow language of this sec-
tion of the Constitution meant that "the crime of treason should not be extended by construc-
tion to doubtful cases." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 127 (1807).
309. See supra notes 211-16 and accompanying text.
310. The demand for a free press, and the political power to enforce its protection, emerged
concomitantly with the growth of the press as a center of financial power. See LEONARD W.
LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 144-45 (rev. ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1985). Printers
often justified their actions and their need for freedom on the grounds that they were simply
seeking profit in the marketplace. "[I]f all the People of different Opinions in this Province
would engage to give me as much for not printing things they don't like, as I can get by
printing them, I should probably live a very easy Life; and if all Printers were everywhere so
dealt by, there would be very little printed." Benjamin Franklin, An Apology for Printers,
PENN. GAZETTE, June 10, 1731, reprinted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO
JEFFERSON: EARLY AMERICAN LIBERTARIAN THEORIES 4-10 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1966).
Franklin's economic argument on behalf of printers was highly influential in shaping the colo-
nial consensus on press freedom. LEVY, supra, at 120 n.2.
311. LEVY, supra note 310, at 269-70.
312. See, eg., id. at 40 (discussing the prosecution of John Peter Zenger).
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common, in fact, during the prerevolutionary era for printers to be
charged with seditious libel and jailed-and then to challenge before the
court of public opinion the validity of their imprisonment by publishing
discussions of their cases.3" 3 Thus, it is hard to credit that the framers-
and the Jeffersonian Republicans whose interpretation of the Amend-
ment during the Sedition Act crisis has proved so important to our mod-
em jurisprudence3 4-would have agreed to a blanket exemption
permitting the legislatures to beggar those accused or convicted of
crimes. The interpretive principle of Riggs, though important, thus lacks
the historical force to overcome the categorical speech and press guaran-
tees of the First Amendment.
What about the general principle of Riggs that no one should profit
from one's own crime? It has a seductive appeal: having committed a
ghastly crime, should criminals profit by that act by basking in publicity
and receiving money from media outlets? The appeal is reflected in the
decision of the New York legislature to title its "Son of Sam" law "Dis-
tribution of moneys received as a result of the commission of crime. ' 315
313. See, e.g., id. at 52-56. William Smith, an Anglican divine, arranged for publication of
a broadside by a judge defending his record against an attack by the Pennsylvania Assembly.
Id. at 52. Both author and printer were jailed by the Assembly, id., and denied a writ of
habeas corpus, id. at 53. After a "mock trial" by the legislative body itself, Smith was sen-
tenced and denied the right to appeal. Id. at 54-55. "In jail Smith proved his mettle by attack-
ing the Assembly in a series of articles ... published in [the] Pennsylvania Journal." Id. at 56.
In another example, the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1767 ordered James Pride, for the
offense of serving a writ upon a member of the House, jailed" 'until discharged by Order of the
House.'" Id. at 72. Pride then "wrote an account of his case, revealing to the public the harsh
treatment he was receiving." Id. However, when the publisher to whom it was sent consulted
the Assembly, the latter "resolved that their prisoner's act was a seditious insult." Id. After
censuring him before the bar of the house, the lawmakers ordered that he be kept" 'in close
confinement, without the Use of Pen, Ink, or Paper."' Id. For a discussion of the role of
jailed speakers in the growth of the modem theory of the First Amendment after the Revolu-
tion, see id. at 294-96. An example is William Keteltas, a Jeffersonian Republican who in 1796
published a newspaper article denouncing the juryless trial of two Irish ferrymen who had been
convicted of insulting an alderman by refusing to row him on a special ferry trip at his de-
mand. Id. at 294. Keteltas was summoned before the New York Assembly and, when he
refused to apologize, ordered jailed. Id. at 295. "[W]hile in prison he published five articles
protesting the 'unconstitutional, tyrannical, and illegal' proceedings of the Assembly." Id.
The articles led to Keteltas's freedom on a writ of habeas corpus and to an unsuccessful suit
for false imprisonment against the speaker of the House. Id. at 296.
314. For an account of the importance of the postrevolutionary struggle over the Sedition
Acts and its importance in the emergence of the contemporary understanding of the First
Amendment, see id. at 325; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-76
(1964) (suggesting that struggle over Sedition Act forged modem understanding of First
Amendment's Speech and Press Clauses). See generally ANTHONY LEwIs, MAKE No LAW:
THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 56-66, 144-46 (1991) (discussing how
historical interpretation of the Sedition Acts episode has shaped litigation in front of the
Supreme Court).
315. N.Y. EXEC. LAWv § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991). At oral argument in the
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Receiving such payments, however, is not the equivalent of the profit
that was to accrue to the defendant in Riggs. His act of murdering his
grandfather also made him his grandfather's heir, and the operation of
law, if not stayed by the court, would have brought him the property.316
Inheriting was, thus, part and parcel of the crime; it involved no other
lawful act.
By contrast, the payments criminals receive for their stories are not
results of their crime in that sense; they are, instead, results of activities
that the criminals engage in after the crime-making and signing con-
tracts, writing, giving interviews, to name a few-many of which are not
only lawful but are affirmatively protected by the Constitution. 317 To
call these funds monies "received as a result of crime" elides and con-
ceals an important interpretive step. In fact, they are received as a result
of a criminal's own desire, drive, and articulacy, coupled with the public's
interest in a specific crime. Without the latter, of course, the criminal
would receive nothing; when posed as one involving money received as a
result of the desire of the public to read or hear about crime from the
criminals' point of view, the issue appears different than the one in Riggs
and allied cases. One may deplore the public's desire to revel in stories of
crimes and to know the inner thoughts of those who commit them, 318 but
Wiseguy case, Justice Scalia challenged the State's characterization of expressive proceeds as
the fruits of crime. He noted that St. Augustine of Hippo, in his autobiographical Confessions,
admitted that he had once stolen an apple. "'So whatever St. Augustine got for the book is the
"proceeds" of apple-stealing?' Justice Scalia asked. 'Your Honor, that's absolutely correct,'
[Counsel for New York Howard] Zwickel replied. 'That's ridiculousl' Justice Scalia ex-
claimed." Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup: Justices Question Broad Reach of
"Son of Sam" Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at B-8.
316. See supra text accompanying note 209.
317. Besides the First Amendment's protection for speech, the ability to enter into con-
tracts is protected against state interference in the body of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cd. 1.
318. Deplorable or not, the public appetite for crime narrative is all but insatiable:
"Pop culture devoured itself, and now even crummy true crimes are getting devel-
oped into books-just because somebody killed somebody," said Joe Sharkey, author
of [two true crime books]. The more shocking the crime, the greater the notoriety-
or advance publicity-it produces. The public is primed, already familiar with the
events and the narrative, which needs no justification since it's factual. The prolifera-
tion of cable channels and the rise of the Fox network have also inspired some liter-
ary ambulance-chasing. "The film production companies read the newspapers and
jump on these cases from day one," Mr. Sharkey said. "It's nothing more than a
hunger for product."
Lisa W. Foderaro, Crimes of Passion, Deals of a Lifetime, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 1991, § 4, at 6.
"Son of Sam" laws, of course, will not prevent publishers from flooding the market with dis-
tasteful crime stories if they discern a popular demand for such. The only effect will be that
such books and films will not reflect the criminals' point of view. In the case discussed in the
New York Times article, film and book rights were sold by a local reporter covering the trial.
Id. However, Penthouse has offered cash to the defendant, a Westchester teacher accused of
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a general regard for the principles of the First Amendment would surely
suggest that there is a presumption against laws that have the effect-and
perhaps the intent-of constricting the public's ability to make that
choice.
As to Snepp,31 9 it seems unwise to extend the precedent further. Al-
ready it shows promise of enough flexibility to swallow significant parts
of the First Amendment. 20 It may have been advisable to create this
murdering her lover's wife, in return for nude photographs. Penthouse editors apparently told
the New York Times that a conviction would prevent this transaction and deprive the world of
this intimate glimpse of the accused killer. Id. Their reasoning is unclear, since my reading of
the statute suggests that-assuming their photographer could get access to a willing subject-
the photos and payment for them would not be subject to attachment unless they were accom-
panied by the defendant's account of the crimes or of her emotions concerning it. This should
be true even if the photos were juxtaposed next to a salacious account of the crimes written by
someone else without the victim's cooperation. One may earnestly hope that the reading pub-
lic, so to speak, will be spared the sight of the accused killer in the pages of Penthouse without
accepting that preventing it is worth putting the First Amendment at risk.
319. See supra notes 189-200 and accompanying text.
320. Federal executive agencies are attempting to make use of Snepp agreements to muzzle
many of those who work in the executive branch, or even simply make use of classified docu-
ments. See Cheh, supra note 201, at 695-98. However, the appetite of the government as
employer for prior restraint is unappeased even by the wide use of imposed contracts on em-
ployees. The latest restriction on government employee speech is the Ethics Reform Act. Eth-
ics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, § 601, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 1716, 1760
(to be codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-505). As part of an attempt to limit honoraria that may be
paid to members of Congress and senior federal executives, the act provides that "[a]n individ-
ual may not receive any honorarium while that individual is a Member, officer, or employee."
Id. (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 501(b)). The Act defines "Member" as a member of Congress.
Id. at 1761 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 505(1)). "Officer or employee means any officer or
employee of the Government" except those paid by the secretary of the Senate (excluding the
vice president) or certain temporary employees. Id. at 1761-62 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 505(2)). "Honorarium" is defined to mean, among other things, "a payment of money or
anything of value for an ... article by a Member, officer or employee." Id. at 1762 (to be
codified at 5 U.S.C. § 505(3)). Thus by its terms the act forbids any regular federal employee,
no matter how lowly, from writing any article for money, no matter on what subject. The act
is interpreted by regulations issued by the Office of Government Ethics (OGE). Limitations on
Outside Employment and Prohibition of Honoraria; Confidential Reporting of Payments to
Charities in Lieu of Honoraria, 56 Fed. Reg. 1721 (1991) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. § 2636).
The OGE interprets the law to permit government employees to work part-time for publica-
tions on a salaried basis, but to prohibit them from "acceptting] compensation for newspaper
or magazine articles," whether written as freelance writers or pursuant to nonemployee con-
tracts. Id. at 1725 (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. § 2636.203(a)(12) example 6). Examples specifi-
cally cited include a review of a book about the New York Yankees written by an employee of
the Office of Personnel Management for the sum of $50. Id. at 1726 (to be codified at 5 C.F.R.
§ 2636.203(d) example 1). The Act has attracted strong opposition from federal employees
and their unions. See Peter G. Crane, Arrest Me, Officer, I'm Writing!: The Case of Congress's
Crazy Ban on Paid Free Speech, WAsH. PosT, Jan. 6, 1991, at C5; see also Bill McAllister, Bill
Would Relax Rules on Honoraria, WASH. PosT, Sept. 13, 1991, at A23 (discussing congres-
sional proposal to allow most federal workers to accept money for writings and speeches
outside their government expertise, but to retain such restrictions for the most senior govern-
ment officials). The groups sued in United States District Court for the District of Columbia
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extraordinary contractual remedy in the admittedly exceptional context
of foreign intelligence, where the fate of nations mhy (sometimes) ride on
secrecy; it is more alarming to regard it as a general exception to the
principle that speech should not be burdened or prohibited except in the
narrowest of circumstances.
Similarly, the Caplin holding,321 broad as it is, may not extend far
enough to insulate the "Son of Sam" law. What Caplin says, in effect, is
that a generally applicable forfeiture statute, directed at seizing without
discrimination all funds that are fruits or proceeds of crime, is not barred
from operating upon funds otherwise within its scope just because those
funds are intended to be used to pay for counsel whose availability is
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 22 By exactly the same principle,
opponents of the "Son of Sam" law would not argue that the First
Amendment requires that proceeds from speech be placed beyond the
reach of tort or restitutionary judgements validly obtained against crimi-
nal defendants. It is far less clear, however, that the statute in Caplin
would have passed muster if it had been written so as to target and seize
the funds used by the defendant to pay his counsel, only those funds, and
no other funds. In other words, the government's interest in preventing
criminals from amassing economic power is sufficient to overcome the
seeking invalidation of the law. The district court refused their request for a permanent in-
junction, and then-Judge Clarence Thomas of the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia upheld the district court action. National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 927
F.2d 1253, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1991), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 664 (1991) (mem.). Judge Thomas denied
the request for the temporary injunction because" 'temporary loss of income, ultimately to be
recovered, does not usually constitute irreparable injury.'" Id. (quoting Sampson v. Murray,
415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974)). Judge Thomas suggested that the employees continue their paid writ-
ing but "put their compensation into escrow during the pendency of this litigation. If they
succeed on their constitutional challenges, they can recover any honoraria paid into those
accounts." Id. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed. National Treasury Employees Union
v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 664 (1991) (mem.). It is tempting to believe that such a sweeping
burden on employee speech, regardless of subject, forum, or amount of compensation, will be
speedily struck down. But a certain cavalier tone seems to be creeping into federal adjudica-
tions about the right to write and to be paid for it. Judge Thomas's assurance that a well-
constructed escrow agreement will prevent irreparable injury may not be convincing to an
underpaid civil servant eking out his or her earnings by writing articles while off duty. It could
be a substantial or even prohibitive burden to maintain these funds in escrow for the pendency
of a potentially long litigation. And, because success at the far end is by no means assured, the
employee is faced with the prospect of putting valuable labor into projects that may never
repay the investment. If the interest in the appearance of confidentiality can be used to suck
the economic vitality from one branch of employee speech, why can the government's interest
in the appearance of propriety by all its employees not be similarly used to do the same for all
employee speech? (Judge Thomas was confirmed as an associate justice of the Supreme Court
on October 15, 1991, a few hours after the eight members of the Court had heard oral argu-
ment in the Wiseguy case.)
321. See supra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
1992] "SON OF SAM" LAWS
right of defendants to use illegal proceeds to pay for lawyers; it might not
be sufficient to justify a statute taking funds because such funds pay for
lawyers.323 Similarly, the "Son of Sam" law does not target all of a de-
fendant's assets to further the interests in victim restitution and prevent-
ing unjust enrichment, but only those generated by protected speech; and
Caplin, properly read, is not broad enough to permit that.
A common sense reading of the First Amendment further indicates
caution about any holding that suggests that speech by criminals about
crime is subject to a lesser standard of protection. As every American
knows, crime is currently (and has been for at least twenty-five years) an
important public issue with broad political implications. 24 Speech about
crime in general, even when distasteful, is too close to the so-called
"core" of political speech to make its excision from the body of protected
speech a risk-free operation. This is true even--or perhaps particu-
larly-when the speech is uttered by those whom society has adjudged
criminal. As the cases cited above from the prehistory of 'the First
Amendment suggest, the decision of what behavior a society will call
323. Exactly this distinction between unexceptionable uses of the police power and uses of
the same power to penalize disapproved speech was involved in the Supreme Court's two re-
cent flag-burning decisions. In the first decision, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), the
Court struck down a state statute that made it a crime to "desecrate" a state or national flag,
which the statute defined as meaning to "deface, damage, or otherwise physically mistreat in a
way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or dis-
cover his action." Id. at 400 n.1. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan said that while the
state could forbid a wide range of conduct, it "may not... proscribe particular conduct
because it has expressive elements." Id. at 406. After the Johnson decision, Congress re-
sponded by enacting a statute outlawing the burning of a flag for any purpose other than
disposal; regardless of the intention'behind it or its effect on onlookers. The Supreme Court
also affirmed a lower court decision striking this law down. United States v. Eichman, 110 S.
Ct. 2404, 2410 (1990). The Court noted that, unlike the Texas statute, the federal law did not
"target expressive conduct on the basis of the content of its message." Id. at 2408. The Court
nonetheless held the law unconstitutional because it "suppress[ed] expression out of concern
for its likely communicative impact." Id. at 2409.
Though strongly worded and generally approved by scholars (if not by the public or poli-
ticians), both these cases were decided by a vote of 5-4. Justice Brennan, who wrote both
opinions, is no longer on the Court; Justice Marshall, who also voted with the majority in both
cases, also has retired.
324. The personification by Republican campaign advertisements of "the crime issue" as a
frightening and (not by coincidence) black rapist is credited by many with having swayed the
1988 presidential election. See, e.g., David Corn, Congressional Follies: The Great Crime-Bill
Show of '91, THE NATION, Apr. 29, 1991, at 550 ("Willie Horton. Willie Horton. Willie
Horton. Have a friend shout those words at you a few hundred times, and then you may have
some sense of what the average Democratic member of Congress hears when politics turns
toward the subject of crime. It's one of those issues-a wedge issue, the Republicans gleefully
call it-that drive Democrats mad."). Almost every Congress struggles to turn the public
outrage over crime into legislation. See Haunted by Crime, ECONOMIST, Apr. 13, 1991, at 23
("Crime policy has become what Washington likes to call a 'mature' issue-one that members
of Congress deem worthy of legislative action.").
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"criminal" is a key political decision-indeed, in some senses, the primal
political decision. Nor is this true only of so-called "speech crimes" like
seditious libel. Three important political figures who might have been
silenced or burdened by Executive Law section 632-a are Henry David
Thoreau, Mohandas K. Gandhi, and Martin Luther King. None of them
was imprisoned for a "speech crime"-Thoreau refused to pay taxes,
Gandhi led "defiance campaigns" against British rule, and King was ac-
cused of disorderly conduct and riotous behavior. 325 Nor would a law
drawn only to penalize speech about "violent crime" suffice to protect
the political interests implicated in speech about crime. The decision of
what acts to call violent, and of what violent acts to punish as crimes (as
opposed to, for example, acts of justified or excused self-defense) is an
important political decision. It is being fought quite intensely in the con-
temporary American polity, for example, in relation to battered spouses
who kill their abusers.3 26 Would it be just, or prudent, to conduct this
debate under laws that muffle the voices of these women?
As to the political nature of speech about crime, it is illustrated by
turning from the overtly politicized question of self-defense by battered
women to the more ordinary, and seemingly apolitical, villainy of Henry
Hill. An integral part of Hill's story is the way in which organized crime
survives by and feeds upon massive, sustained corruption within govern-
ment generally and the system of justice in particular.327 Such informa-
tion is, though perhaps not surprising, nonetheless a significant
confirmation of public suspicion about the courts and police of New
York-the state that is attempting to sequester Hill's proceeds and
thereby to make less likely that another "reformed" hoodlum will share
325. Judge Newman, in his dissent in Fischetti, raises the question whether King's Where
Do We Go From Here? would have been published under New York Executive Law § 632-a.
Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 787 (Newman, J., dissenting). It is also cogent to ask whether Letter
from Birmingham Jail would have seen print if Alabama authorities had obtained a conviction
against King and then brought into play their present statute, with its 10-year prison term for
publishers who violate it. If a future King arises in Alabama, it may be significantly harder for
him to be heard outside prison. Indeed, if a future publisher in Alabama falls afoul of the law,
it will be extremely hard for him to alert the rest of us to what has happened.
326. See, eg., CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN,
SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE LAW 5 (1989) (arguing that current self-defense doctrine discrimi-
nates against abused women).
327. See PILEGGI, supra note 5, at 16 (discussing lenient sentences given to mobster by
named New York State judges); id. at 55-56 (widespread use of payoffs to politicians); id. at
146-47 (acquiescence of prison authorities in organized crime activities in return for bribes).
The possible direct connection between criminal speech and protected political speech is illus-
trated by recent charges by Henry Hill that mob influence reached Senator Alfonse D'Amato
(R-NY). See Sydney H. Schanberg, It's Time for D'Amato to Cut the Comedy, NEWSDAY,
Apr. 30, 1991, at 79.
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with the public the story of how the system and the mob feed on each
other or that a publisher will print another such account.
Perhaps nothing in Wiseguy is more outrageous, in the end, than the
astounding story of how, thanks to the bounty of the federal Witness
Protection Program, Henry Hill and his family profited from his
crimes-profits derived far more directly from crime than Henry Hill's
literary proceeds. 328 While Hill remained in the Witness Protection Pro-
gram, the public paid Hill's handsome monthly salary; the public fisc
bought Hill a new home, a business, two cars, and special food from
Little Italy. Having unwittingly and involuntarily footed the bill for all
this profit from crime, the public is then told in indignant tones that it
must be prevented from voluntarily rewarding Henry Hill for telling it
what he has done. If Executive Law section 632-a had worked as it was
probably intended to, Henry Hill would still have emerged from his years
in the mob as the ultimate wiseguy, but the public would be none the
wiser.
Editor's note: On December 10, 1991, shortly before this issue went to
press, the Supreme Court unanimously overturned New York's "Son of
Sam" law on First Amendment grounds.3 29 In an opinion written by Jus-
tice O'Connor, a majority of the Court found that the statute was a con-
tent-based restriction on speech330 and thus ' presumptively inconsistent
with the First Amendment. " 331 The majority acknowledged that the State
has compelling interests in "ensuring that victims of crime are compen-
sated by those who harm them" and in "ensuring that criminals do not
profit from their crimes."332 It concluded, however, that, due to the
breadth of its application in two different respects, the statute was not
"narrowly tailored" to advance those interests. 333 Specifically, it identified
the statute's applicability "to works on any subject, provided that they ex-
press the author's thoughts or recollections about his crime, however, tan-
gentially or incidentally," and the "statute's broad definition of 'person
convicted of a crime,'" which allowed the State "to escrow the income of
any author who admits in his work to having committed a crime, whether
or not the author was ever actually accused or convicted. " 334 The majority
328. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
329. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., No. 90-
1059, 1991 WL 256877, at *10 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1991).
330. Id. at *7.
331. Id. at *6.
332. Id. at *8.
333. Id. at *9.
334. Id.
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expressly declined to comment on the constitutionality of other "Son of
Sam" laws:
We conclude simply that in the Son of Sam law, New York has
singled out speech on a particular subject for a financial burden
it places on no other speech and on no other income. The State's
interest in compensating victims from the fruits of crime is a
compelling one, but the Son of Sam law is not narrowly tailored
to advance that objective. As a result, the statute is inconsistent
with the First Amendment.335
In a brief opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Blackmun ar-
gued that the statute was "underinclusive as well as overinclusive, " and
that in the interests of giving other states guidance the Court should have
addressed this issue.336 In a longer concurrence, Justice Kennedy argued
that it was "both unnecessary and incorrect" for the Court to apply the
"narrowly tailored" analysis to the statute:
That test or formulation derives from our equal protection juris-
prudence and has no real or legitimate place when the Court
considers the straightforward question whether the State may en-
act a burdensome restriction of speech based on content only,
apart from any considerations of time, place, and manner or the
use of public forums. 337
335. Id at *10.
336. Id. at *11 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
337. Id (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
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